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I. INTRODUCTION

In a book published in 1912, Marxist historian Gustavus Myers branded the United States Supreme Court a tool of the dominant capitalist class.' Part of the evidence he offered to support
his characterization was the appointment that year of Associate
Justice Mahlon Pitney, a native of what Myers called "that essentially plutocratic town," Morristown, New Jersey.2 This was, he
claimed, an event that gratified the great capitalist interests and
"was inimical to the workers." 3 Summarizing Justice Pitney's career in 1969, historian Fred Israel also pictured him as a conservative bulwark against innovation,4 notable mainly for his
persistent hostility to labor.5
Such characterizations of Pitney are inaccurate. He did hand
down a number of antiunion decisions, and he did interpret the
income tax amendment in a manner arguably favorable to the
wealthy, but this judge was no tool of the capitalists. Indeed,
Pitney opposed monopoly in both the political and judicial arenas. Although hostile to trade unions, he wrote opinions that
advanced the interests of unorganized workers, especially those
victimized by industrial accidents. Far from being a die-hard reactionary, Mahlon Pitney was a judge whose career reflected the
Progressivism that dominated American politics during the early
years of the twentieth century. Some of Pitney's ideas seem illiberal today, but many of the reformers of his own time shared his
views. Consequently, they gave him their political support. As a
state judge, and later as a United States Supreme Court Justice,
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he took positions on issues similar to those of contemporaries
whom historians have labeled "Progressives." That appellation
fits Pitney too, for his judicial opinions mirror concerns, values,
and biases characteristic of Progressivism.
II. PROGRESSIVISM

Pitney's judicial opinions link him to the "[c]onvulsive reform movements [that] swept across the American landscape
from the 1890s to 1917."6 These movements promoted a variety
of economic, political, and social changes, which their proponents believed would "improve the conditions of life and labor"
and stabilize American society. 7 Progressive reform crusades
were extremely diverse. As several historians have pointed out,
Progressivism was not a unified movement. Progressives pursued a variety of goals; indeed, they often disagreed among
themselves, even about how to achieve commonly held
objectives.8
On no issue were the disagreements among reformers
sharper than on the question of what to do about the giant combinations of capital that Americans referred to inaccurately and
pejoratively as "the trusts." 9 One group of Progressives, for
whom Theodore Roosevelt was the most prominent spokesman,
considered bigness in business inevitable and desirable. Rather
than smashing the trusts, they argued, the Federal Government
should subject them to continuous administrative supervision.' 0
It should distinguish between those that behaved themselves and
those that did not, and it should use intermittent law suits to discipline the miscreants." Woodrow Wilson and his advisor in the
1912 presidential campaign, Louis Brandeis (later a colleague of
Pitney on the Supreme Court), favored a vastly different approach. They idealized small economic units, and rather than
6 A. LINK & R. MCCORMICK, PROGRESSIVISM 1 (1983). This book is the best
short survey of Progressivism. It also provides a good introduction to the scholarly
literature on the subject.
7 Id. at 2.
8 See id.
9 Most of these big businesses were not true trusts. John D. Rockefeller did
accomplish a horizontal combination of competing firms in the oil industry in 1882
by creating a trust. G. PORTER, THE RISE OF BIG BUSINESS, 1860-1910, at 56
(1973). After 1889, however, such a horizontal combination was normally achieved
by creating a holding company incorporated under the laws of New Jersey. See id.
10 See J. GARRATY, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN NATION 368-69 (2d ed.
1974).
11 See id. at 369.
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regulating monopolies, they wanted to break them up by enacting legislation that would effectively outlaw giant combinations
of capital. 2
Progressives of this type held views deeply rooted in the
American past, views that had been widely accepted since before
the Civil War. Both Jacksonian Democrats and the leaders of the
infant Republican party of the late 1850's were deeply suspicious
of corporations and economic concentration. They feared that
these might restrict the options open to wage earners and small
entrepreneurs and interfere with the efforts of these groups to
attain economic independence and upward social mobility. The
Democratic version of this antebellum ideology emphasized conflict between labor and capital, but most Republicans believed
there was a harmony of interests between different social classes.
For this reason, the Republicans opposed self-conscious, working-class actions such as strikes, which they saw as interfering
with the rights of others. They believed that an individual might
quit any job he chose, but that it was wrong for him to join with
others to shut down his employer or to keep those who wanted to
work from doing so.'" Unions, like corporations, were aggregations of power that threatened the opportunities of enterprising
members of the middle class. 14 Hostility toward combinations of
both labor and capital was central to the thinking of the advocates of laissez faire,' 5 who gained intellectual pre-eminence in
the United States during the decades after the Civil War.
Turn-of-the-century Supreme Court Justice John Marshall
Harlan, known as a rigorous enforcer of the antitrust laws, also
exhibited a distinct lack of sympathy for workers' organizations. 16
Even Brandeis, although a friend of the trade union movement,
"was absolutely opposed to the closed shop as a form of labor
despotism."'" As late as 1909, Woodrow Wilson declared, "'I
12

See T.

MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION

111 (1984).

13 See generally E. FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 16-17 (1970) (discussing the free-

labor outlook).
14 See id. at 20, 22, 25.
15 See Benedict, Laissez-Faireand Liberty: A Re-evaluation of the Meaning and Origins
of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAw & HIST. REV. 293, 308 (1985).

16 For Harlan's views on concentrations of capital and the enforcement of the
Sherman Antitrust Act against them, see G.E. WIrrE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 136-38 (1976). For his attitudes
toward unions and his views on liberty of contract in the labor market, see his opinion in Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
17 p. STRUM, Louis D. BRANDEIS 343 (1984).
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am a fierce partizan [sic] of the Open Shop and of everything that
makes for individual liberty.' "18 To many small employers and
middle-class professionals, unions seemed like just another type
of monopoly-originated for the same reasons as the industrial
monopoly and likely to produce similar results."9 During the late
1890's and the early years of the twentieth century, the average
middle-class citizen viewed himself as a member of an unorganized, and therefore helpless, consuming public, threatened from
above by mushrooming trusts and from below by workers combining to protect themselves.20
Historian Richard Hofstadter once characterized Progressivism as "the complaint of the unorganized against the consequences of organization."' 2 1 His thesis that it was caused by the
status anxieties of the middle class 2 2 has by now been largely refuted by other scholars.2 3 There were, however, other reasons
for members of the unorganized middle class to feel threatened
by the growing power of big business above and trade unions
below. One was inflation. During the period from 1897 to 1913,
the cost of living rose thirty-five per cent. Although the increase
was modest by today's standards, the Country was then emerging
from a period of deflation, and the public tended to blame rising
prices on "the sudden development of a vigorous, if small, labor
movement, and an extraordinary acceleration in the trustification
of American industry. "24 The second important reason for the
development of reform sentiments within the unorganized mid18 A. LINK, WILSON: THE ROAD TO THE WHITE HOUSE 127 (1947) (footnote omitted). During his 1910 campaign for governor, Wilson repudiated what he had said
earlier about unions, claiming he had not really meant it. Id. at 159, 184.
19 G. MOWRY, THE ERA OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT: 1900-1912, at 100 (1958).
20 R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 170 (1955).
21 Id. at 216. Contra R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877-1920 passim
(1967) (arguing Progressivism was part of effort to impose order upon chaotic, new
society created by rapid industrialization).
22 See R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 20, at 135. Hofstadter states:
It is my thesis that men of this sort [Progressive reformers], who might
be designated broadly as the Mugwump type, were Progressives not because of economic deprivations but primarily because they were victims
of an upheaval in status that took place in the United States during the
closing decades of the nineteenth and the early years of the twentieth
century. Progressivism, in short, was to a very considerable extent led
by men who suffered from the events of their time not through a
shrinkage in their means but through the changed pattern in the distribution of deference and power.
Id.
23 See A. LINK & R. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 7 ("No interpretation has been
more sharply criticized than Hofstadter's status-revolution theory.").
24 R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 20, at 168-69.

MR. JUSTICE PITNEY

1986]

385

die class was a sudden increase in public awareness of the extent
to which big corporations were corrupting the political process in
order to advance their own interests at the expense of other segments of American society.25 The fears and resentments of the
middle class were certainly not the only reasons for the development of Progressivism, 26 but they do explain the career of MahIon Pitney and its relationship to that reform movement. 7
III.

THE NEW JERSEY YEARS

A. Background and Early Life
Progressives were mostly old-stock Americans with British
ethnic backgrounds who came from economically secure middleclass families. 28 Religiously, they were most often Calvinists, affiliated with denominations such as the Congregationalists and
the Presbyterians. 29 In a day when few Americans went to college, most Progressives were college graduates. 3 ° A majority of
those active in politics were lawyers. 1
In other words, the typical Progressive reformer was someone very much like Mahlon Pitney. Pitney's ancestors had come
to New Jersey from England in the early 1700's, and the great
grandfather for whom he was named served in George Washington's army during the Revolutionary War.3 2 The future Justice
was born the second son of attorney Henry C. Pitney on the family farm near Morristown on February 5, 1858." 3 He attended
private schools in Morristown, and as befits a New Jersey PresbySee id. at 172-73.
Arthur Link and Richard McCormick contend that "middle-class interpretations of Progressivism" are meaningless because at the turn of the century, most
Americans were part of the middle class. A. LINK & R. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at
7-8. While it is true that only a minority of Americans were not members of the
middle class, it does not follow that the concerns of the middle class did not inspire
some of those who belonged to it to become reformers.
27 It may be that an interpretation of Progressivism that emphasizes the reaction
of the middle class to what its members perceived as threats from above and below
is more useful for explaining the development and nature of that phenomenon in
the region from which Pitney hailed-the urban Northeast-than in the South and
Middle West, where the organization of the working class into labor unions had not
progressed nearly as far as it had in states such as New Jersey.
25
26

28
29
30
31

See G.

MOWRY,

supra note 19, at 86.

See id. at 86-87.
See id. at 86.
See id.; see also Thelen, Social Tensions and the Origins of Progressivism, 56 J. AM.
HIsT. 323, 330-34 (1969) (arguing that Progressives came from backgrounds similar to those of their conservative opponents).
32 See Israel, supra note 4, at 2001.
33 Id.

386

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 16:381

terian, he enrolled at Princeton in 1875. 34
Pitney studied hard at Princeton, and during his senior year,
he played first base on and managed the baseball team.1 5 Among
his classmates were Robert McCarter, who would later serve as
attorney general of New Jersey,3 6 and Thomas Woodrow Wilson,
who was destined to become President of the United States.
On November 30, 1915, the class of 1879 held a reunion at the
White House hosted by President Wilson and attended by,
among others, Justice Pitney.3 8
After graduating from Princeton, young Mahlon followed his
father into what was rapidly becoming the family professionlaw. H.C. Pitney, a country lawyer who had served as prosecutor
of the pleas for Morris County in the 1860's, capped a successful
career by becoming a vice chancellor in 1889, a position he held
until 1907. 39 His sons, Henry C., Jr. and John O.H. (founding
partner of Pitney, Hardin, Kipp & Szuch) also took up the practice of law.4 ° " 'I could hardly have escaped it,' " Mahlon once
remarked. 41 After discussing career options with his father, he
decided that following graduation, he would read law in the elder
Pitney's office. 4 2 That form of preparation for the bar proved to
be less than thrilling. " 'I found the work very dull at first, and
Blackstone very dry reading,' " the future Supreme Court Justice
admitted later. 43 On the other hand, he learned an immense
amount, "'most of it from [his] father who was a walking encyclopedia of law.' 44
B. Law Practice
After a period of intense cramming with his close friend
34 Id. See generally Obituaries,48 N.J.L.J. 29, 29 (1925) (summary of Pitney's life).
35 Obituaries, supra note 34, at 29.
36

Id.; see also Princeton College, The Class Of 1879: Quindecennial Record

1879-1894, at 85 (1894) (stating Pitney was "in frequent conflict with" McCarter)

[hereinafter cited as Class of 1879].
37 Israel, supra note 4, at 2001.
38 Newark Evening News, Dec. 1, 1915, in Mahlon Pitney Papers (in the personal
possession ofJames C. Pitney, Morristown, NewJersey) [hereinafter cited as Pitney
Papers]; see Letter from Woodrow Wilson to Mahlon Pitney (Nov. 22, 1915), in
Pitney Papers, supra.
39 See BENCH AND BAR OF NEWJERSEY 209 (1942).
40 See Obituaries, supra note 34, at 29.
41 A. Breed, Mahlon Pitney: His Life and Career-Political and Judicial 8 (undated, unpublished thesis, Princeton University).
42 See id. at 8-9.
43 Id. at 9.
44 Id. at 10.
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Francis J. Swayze (who would be his colleague on the New Jersey
bench and rival for a seat on the United States Supreme Court),4 5
Pitney took and passed the bar examinations. He was admitted
as an attorney at law and solicitor in chancery in 1882, and three
years later he became a counselor. 46 For the first seven years after his admission to the bar, Pitney practiced alone in Dover, New
Jersey. 47 There he acted as counsel to the Cranbury Iron Company, which he also served as a director and an officer. 4 8 In addi49
tion, Pitney found time to manage a Dover department store.
When his father was appointed vice chancellor in 1889, Mahlon returned to Morristown to take over H.C.'s firm, Pitney &
Youngblood.5 ° He achieved a reputation as both a skillful appellate advocate and a clever trial lawyer. 5 ' By 1894, Pitney was
"justly regarded as one of the leading legal lights in New
52
Jersey."
C. Political Career
1. Congress
In the fall of 1894, Pitney entered politics, running for the
House seat from the Fourth Congressional District.5 3 Like his
father, Mahlon was a Republican, and the Fourth was normally a
Democratic stronghold.5 4 In 1894, the Country was in the
depths of a depression, however, and voters troubled by hard
times were turning against the party of Democratic President
Grover Cleveland. 55 Although a newspaper supporting his opponent, Johnston Cornish, stated that "no Democrat [could] be expected to vote for Mr. Pitney, because he represents in the most
radical degree every principal [sic] of Republicanism that is dis45 See id. at 9.

46 See id. at 9-10; Letter from Wilbur F. Sadler, Jr. to Mahlon Pitney (May 5,
1914), in Pitney Papers, supra note 38.
47 A. Breed, supra note 41, at 10.
48 Id.
49 See id.
50 Id.
51 See id. at 11.
52 Class of 1879, supra note 36, at 85. Robert McCarter, Pitney's classmate at
Princeton and frequent rival at the bar, once wrote, "The aggravating fact about
Pitney was that whatever he did, he did well." R. MCCARTER, MEMORIES OF A HALF
CErrURY AT THE NEW JERSEY BAR 89 (1937). This included chess, dancing, and
golf, as well as the practice of law. Id. at 88-89.
53 See Obituaries, supra note 34, at 29-30; A. Breed, supra note 41, at 12.
54 See supra note 53.
55 See Gould, The Republican Searchfor a NationalMajority, in THE GILDED AGE 17 1,
183 (H. Morgan ed. 1970).
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tasteful to a Democrat, "56 many obviously did. Pitney carried the
district by 1407 votes.5 7
During his first term in the House, Speaker Thomas B. Reed
named him to both the Committee on Reform in the Civil Service
and the powerful Appropriations Committee. 58 Although Pitney
seldom opened his mouth on the floor,5 9 the performance of the
quiet freshman from New Jersey obviously pleased "Czar" Reed.
When Pitney stood for re-election in 1896, the Speaker traveled
to Morristown to give a major address and to endorse his candidacy.60 Pitney again prevailed at the polls, defeating Democrat
Augustus W. Cutler by 2977 votes.6 1
During his second term in the House, he assumed a somewhat higher profile, frequently participating in debate.6 2 Pitney
spoke out against what he regarded as the excessively large appropriations proposed for various departments of the Government. 63 He also served on the committee to which the Alaska
boundary dispute was assigned. All of its members were asked to
prepare briefs on the controversy, and Pitney's was so "exhaustive that he was assigned to manage the passage of the . . . report" that the committee presented to the full House. 64
2. State Senate
Although successful, Pitney's second term ended prematurely. He resigned on January 5, 1899 to take a seat in the New
Jersey Senate. 65 Both he and his wife, the former Florence
Shelton, "longed to return to Morristown and their friends"
there.6 6 In addition, Pitney wanted to be governor.6 7 Early in
1898, he made the obligatory pilgrimage to the Camden railroad
office that served as the headquarters of New Jersey's Republican
56
57

True Democratic Banner, Sept. 27, 1894, in Pitney Papers, supra note 38.
A. Breed, supra note 41, at 12.

58 See id.
59 It is interesting to note that the New York Daily Tribune later claimed, "Pitney
surprised some of the old-timers by making a number of excellent speeches during
his first term in Congress." N.Y. Daily Tribune, May 10, 1897, in Pitney Papers,
supra note 38. The CongressionalRecord, however, lends no support to this bit of
Republican puffery.
60 See Morris County Chronicle, Oct. 16, 1896, in Pitney Papers, supra note 38.
61 A. Breed, supra note 41, at 13.

62 Id.
63 See id.

64 Obituaries, supra note 34, at 30.
65 See A. Breed, supra note 41, at 14.
66 Id.

67 See id. at 16.
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"boss," William J. Sewall, seeking Sewall's endorsement. 6 He
did not get it. The "boss," who favored another candidate, told
Pitney that he had to broaden his base in state politics before
seeking the governorship. 6 9 Assured by Sewall that if elected to
the New Jersey senate he could have the minority leadership,
Pitney ran for the Morris County seat
in November of 1898,70
71
winning by a plurality of 831 votes.
When the Republicans gained control of the upper chamber
in 1900, he became president of the senate.7 2 During his three
years in Trenton, Pitney won acclaim for a thorough "study of
the proposed Morris Canal abandonment scheme," which he revealed was almost exclusively for the benefit of the lessee of the
canal, the Lehigh Valley Railroad.7 3 His efforts prevented consummation of this dubious project7" and even won him praise
from a newspaper otherwise highly critical of the state senate.7 5
Pitney's success in Trenton made him a leading contender
for the Republican gubernatorial nomination and a likely winner
of the state's highest office.7 6 Before the 1901 election, however,
the ChiefJustice of the NewJersey Supreme Court, David A. Depew, resigned.7 7 Governor Foster M. Voorhees elevated Associate Justice William S. Gummere to the chief justiceship, and on
February 5, 1901, he nominated Pitney to fill the resulting vacancy. 78 On that day, Pitney also celebrated his forty-third birthday. 79 His fellow senators quickly confirmed their colleague from
Morristown,8 0 bringing an end to his career in elective politics.
68
69
70
71

Id. at 15; Israel, supra note 4, at 2002.
See Israel, supra note 4, at 2002.
Id.
Obituaries,supra note 34, at 30.

72 See id.
73 Id.
74 Id.

75 See Letter from Mahlon Pitney to the Editor of the Sunday Call (Mar. 28,
1901), in Pitney Papers, supra note 38. In his letter, Pitney complained, "You give
me full credit for the defeat of the Morris Canal bill." Id. He also defended the
integrity of the New Jersey Legislature: "And I want to say, Mr. Editor, that your
wholesale denunciation of the Senate as debauched, corrupt, incapable of good
action and subservient to the bosses is as cruel and unjust an accusation as I have
ever read." Id.
76 Israel, supra note 4, at 2002; Obituaries, supra note 34, at 30; A. Breed, supra
note 41, at 16.
77 A. Breed, supra note 41, at 17.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
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3. Progressive Politician
His career suggests that Pitney was part of the emergent Progressive movement that was just beginning to gather momentum
around the Country when he abandoned the political arena for
the bench. To be sure, Pitney took traditional Republican positions on the issues in his two races for Congress. 8 ' As historian
George Mowry has pointed out, however, most of those who
would later be identified as Progressives were conservatives in
the middle 1890's.82 In the landmark Presidential election of
1896, these nascent Progressives opposed William Jennings
Bryan, who, as the candidate of the Democratic and Populist parties, advocated the free and unlimited coinage of silver as a pan83
acea for the economic woes of American farmers and workers.
Certainly, Pitney was part of this opposition. " 'What we need,' "
he thundered, " 'is . . .not more money, but more confidence
and more business.' "84 Pitney's Princeton classmate Woodrow
Wilson, now remembered as a Progressive governor and President, took a similar position. He denounced Bryan and cast his
ballot for a breakaway faction of the Democratic party that favored retention of the gold standard. 5
What made reformers of men such as Wilson and Pitney
were the economic and political abuses of the great corporations.8 6 Such abuses were particularly serious in New Jersey,
where during the 1880's and 1890's, the legislature adopted a
series of laws designed to facilitate the formation of holding companies and monopolies.8 7 Between 1896 and 1913, the state did
81 Besides defending the gold standard, Pitney also supported that traditional
Republican bromide, the protective tariff. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying
text. In 1894, a Democratic newspaper characterized him as "a Protectionist of the
rankest and most radical sort." True Democratic Banner, Sept. 27, 1894, in Pitney
Papers, supra note 38.
82 G. MOWRY, supra note 19, at 87.
83 See Fite, Election of 1896, in 2 HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
1787, 1822 (A. Schlesinger ed. 1971). Many American farmers were deeply in debt.
Bryan's proposal for the free and unlimited coinage of silver into money would
have produced inflation, thus lightening the burden of their debts. See J. HICKS,
THE POPULIST REVOLT 315-16 (1931). The idea was not very appealing to urban
workers, however, for it would have meant a shrinkage in their real wages. See Fite,
supra, at 18, 22-23. As Pitney pointed out in a speech on the House floor on February 3, 1898, the free-silver issue caused New Jersey Democrats to desert their party
by the thousands in 1896. See 31 CONG. REC. 165 app., 167 app. (1898).
84 Morris County Chronicle, Oct. 16, 1896, in Pitney Papers, supra note 38.
85 See A. LINK, supra note 18, at 25.
86 See id. at 134-35.
87 Id. at 134; R. NOBLE, JR., NEW JERSEY PROGRESSIVISM BEFORE WILSON 4-6, 911 (1946); see McCurdy, The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and the Modernization of
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a bargain-counter business in corporate charters, enriching its
treasury with filing fees while giving a legal home to all of the
largest holding companies in the Nation and a majority of the
lesser trusts as well.88 Their rush to incorporate in New Jersey
earned her the nickname "the mother of trusts."89 Particularly
offensive to New Jerseyans themselves were the utility companies, which controlled gas, electric, trolley, and street railway service in the northern part of the state. 90 Backed by the major
banks and insurance firms, these corporations enjoyed intimate
relations with the leaders of both the Democratic and Republican
parties, many of whom had financial interests in the companies. 91
It is hardly surprising that utilities benefited from extremely
favorable franchise arrangements and quite low taxes.92
During the period from 1905 to 1912, these firms came
under attack by reformers in both political parties. The first to
take the offensive were the so-called "New Idea" Republicans,
led by Jersey City Mayor Mark Fagan, his corporation's counsel,
George Record, and Essex County Senator Everett Colby.93 By
1906, the "New Idea" men had become such a potent force in
the northern part of the state that the Republican majority in the
legislature hastened to endorse their demands for increased taxation of railroad property and for legislation imposing limitations
on the franchises that local governments routinely granted to
utility corporations. 9 4 In 1911, Democratic Governor Woodrow
Wilson joined the assault. His administration secured passage of
legislation creating a board of public utility commissioners and
American CorporationLaw, 1869-1903, 53 Bus. HIST. REV. 304, 322-23 (1979). As
McCurdy notes, "Between 1891 and 1894 the rise of the New Jersey corporation
overshadowed all other aspects of the trust problem in the public mind." Id. at
328. Particularly useful to the great industrial combinations of the era were two
Acts of the NewJersey Legislature. One authorized NewJersey corporations to do
business outside the state and to issue their own stock in order to purchase stock in
other corporations. See Act of May 9, 1889, ch. 265, §§ 1, 4, 1889 N.J. Laws 412,
412, 415. The other allowed corporations organized for any lawful purpose to
carry on business anywhere, to hold securities in other concerns, and to issue their
own stock in payment for property. See Act of Apr. 21, 1896, ch. 185, §§ 7, 49, 50,
1896 N.J. Laws 277, 280, 293-94, 294. The latter law also gave corporations organized under it wide power to alter their charters. See id. § 28, 1896 N.J. Laws at 286.
88 See A. LINK, supra note 18, at 134.
89

Id.

90

R.

NOBLE, JR.,

supra note 87, at 10-11.

91 Id. at 9-10.
92

Id. at 10-11.

93 Id. at 24, 51.
94 Id. at 65 n.3, 66-71.
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investing it with the power to set rates and regulate service. 95
Fourteen years before that measure became law, Mahlon
Pitney had spoken out against abuse of the public by a utility corporation. In particular, he focused on the United States Electric
Lighting Company, a firm that for years had enjoyed a monopoly
franchise for lighting the streets of the Nation's Capital. In an
1897 debate on the floor of the House of Representatives, Pitney
vigorously attacked the lighting company and endorsed the efforts of the District of Columbia Commissioners to give some of
its business to a competing firm. 9 6 No company "that has the full
control in a matter of this sort can be trusted to care for the public interests," Pitney told his colleagues.9 7 What would best serve
the interests of consumers was competition.9 8 The following
year, in probably his most famous House speech, Pitney defended his home state against charges by Populist Congressman
"Sockless" Jerry Simpson of Kansas that NewJersey was guilty of
coddling the trusts. Although denouncing Simpson for preaching a doctrine that would "lead us directly to socialism," Pitney
endorsed "reasonable measures of regulation for the government of corporations" and the use of the equity powers of the
judiciary to prevent corporate abuses. 99 As he left the New
Jersey Senate for the bench in 1901, he denounced "bills . . .
contrived for the purpose of establishing or bolstering up a par10 0
tial or total monopoly."
D. State Judge
Like his political rhetoric, Pitney's performance as a state
judge reflected attitudes commonly associated with Progressivism. He served as an associate judge of the New Jersey Supreme
Court from February 19, 1901 to January 22, 1908.101 During
95 A. LINK, supra note 18, at 262-63; see also Act of Apr. 21, 1911, ch. 195, 1911
N.J. Laws 374 (creating the Board of Public Utility Commissioners).
96 See 29 CONG. REC. 1448-55 (1897).
When Representative Baker of New
Hampshire argued that the new firm, the Potomac Company, would have to tear up
the streets in order to lay a conduit for its lines, Pitney replied, "[S]o far as my
personal feeling is concerned, if the Commissioners had any discretion they might
better authorize the tearing up of a few blocks more of the sacred pavements of
Washington, in order to break up this controlling monopoly that has been here for
so many years." Id. at 1453.
97 Id. at 1454.
98 Id. at 1455.
99 31 CONG. REC. 167 app. (1898).
100 Letter from Mahlon Pitney to the Editor of the Sunday Call (Mar. 28, 1901), in
Pitney Papers, supra note 38.
101 Israel, supra note 4, at 2003; A. Breed, supra note 41, at 17-18.
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this tenure, he wrote a total of 167 opinions, dealing with a wide
variety of civil and criminal legal problems.' °2 Only four times
did the court of errors and appeals reverse one of his
decisions.103

Pitney's performance earned him a promotion. When Chancellor William J. Magie retired in January of 1908, Governor J.
Franklin Fort nominated him to a full seven-year term as Magie's
successor."0 4 The senate, not even bothering with the usual reference to committee, quickly confirmed the choice. 10 5 During
Pitney's four years and two months as chancellor, he headed both
the law and equity branches of the court of errors and appeals. 10 6
He handed down forty-seven decisions on the law side and approximately eleven on the equity side.'0 7 His responsibilities as
chancellor also included coordinating the work of the vice chancellors, who presided over the various districts into which the
state was then divided.' 08 This made him briefly the superior of
his father, who had already submitted his resignation before
Mahlon's appointment, but remained on thejob for a few months
after his son took office.109 As chancellor, Pitney inaugurated the
practice of having all the vice chancellors meet two or three times
a year to discuss any problems they were experiencing in their
districts." 0 What attracted the attention of the press, however,
was his "scoring [of] the Camden law firm of French & Richards
for oppressive conduct in attempting to charge the Amparo Mining Company $75,000 for legal fees" by reducing the firm's fee to
Israel, supra note 4, at 2003.
Id.
See Obituaries, supra note 34, at 30.
Id. When his friend Francis Swayze expressed regret about his leaving the
supreme court, Pitney told him "that [he] would like to be both a Supreme Court
Justice and Chancellor." Letter from Mahlon Pitney to John R. Hardin (Jan. 25,
1908), in Pitney Papers, supra note 38.
106 Israel, supra note 4, at 2003; A. Breed, supra note 41, at 20.
107 A. Breed, supra note 41, at 20.
102
103
104
105

108 See id.

109 Family legend has it that Chancellor Pitney was once seen by a friend at a
railroad station with a dour look on his face. Asked what was bothering him, he
replied that he was on his way to reverse a decision of his father. Interview with
James C. Pitney, Grandson of Justice Pitney, in Morristown, New Jersey (Apr. 15,
1985). At a banquet held to honor Pitney shortly after his appointment to the
United States Supreme Court, his Princeton classmate, then-Attorney General Robert H. McCarter, recalled "those scenes at (Pitney's] father's home at Morristown,
when [he] would return from Trenton and announce that the Court of Errors and
Appeals had reversed the decision of Vice Chancellor Pitney, the judgment being
rendered by Pitney, J." Jersey's Honor to Justice Pitney, 35 N.J.L.J. 139, 140 (1912)
[hereinafter cited asJersey's Honor].
110 A. Breed, supra note 41, at 20.
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only $12,500."'1
The Amparo Company had more reason to applaud Pitney's
performance on the state bench than did most corporations. His
decisions in cases challenging efforts to subject railroads to increased taxation revealed the continuing development of the incipient Progressivism that he had displayed as a politician. The
constant in these rulings was the identity of the losing party; it
was always the railroad. For example, Pitney spurned 1 2 the Bergen and Dundee Railroad's challenge to the constitutionality of
the 1905 Duffield Act, 1 3 a measure subjecting all property of
railroads and canals except their "main stem" to taxation by local
governments. He also upheld the validity, under both the state
constitution and the fourteenth amendment, 1 14 of 1906 legislation that removed the main stem classification from property formerly so denominated 1 5 and equalized the tax rates on that part
of railroad and canal property subject solely to 16state taxation with
the rates on other New Jersey real property."
Pitney again rebuffed railroads when they complained about
amount
of their tax assessments' 1 7 and when they objected to
the
the inclusion of particular pieces of real estate in the "second
class" category subject to local taxation.' 18 He ruled in favor of
the mayor and aldermen of Jersey City in a suit against both the
State Board of Equalization and the Central Railroad Company
of New Jersey. 1 9 The suit arose after the board, at the instigain
tion of the railroad, ordered a reassessment of all real property
120
the community without giving notice to other taxpayers.
111 Newark Evening News, June 8, 1910, in Pitney Papers, supra note 38. Both
French and Richards were friends of the chancellor; in reducing their fee, he rejected arguments made on their behalf by his Princeton classmate, Robert McCarter. See id.
112 See Bergen & Dundee R.R. v. State Bd. of Assessors, 74 N.J.L. 742, 67 A. 668
(1907).
113 Ch. 91, 1905 N.J. Laws 189.
114 See Central R.R. v. State Bd. of Assessors, 75 N.J.L. 120, 67 A. 672 (Sup. Ct.
1907), aff'd, 75 N.J.L 771, 69 A. 239 (1908).
115 See Average Rate Law, ch. 82, 1906 N.J. Laws 121.
116 See Perkins Act, ch. 280, 1906 N.J. Laws 571; see also Act of Apr. 18, 1906, ch.
122, 1906 N.J. Laws 220 (defining "main stem").
117 See Tuckerton R.R. v. State Bd. of Assessors, 75 N.J.L. 157, 67 A. 69 (Sup. Ct.
1907).
118 See In re New York Bay R.R., 75 N.J.L. 389, 67 A. 1049 (Sup. Ct. 1907); In re
United N.J.R.R. & Canal, 75 N.J.L. 385, 67 A. 1075 (Sup. Ct. 1907), rev'd, 76 N.J.L
830, 71 A. 275 (1908).
119 See Mayor ofJersey City v. Board of Equalization of Taxes, 74 N.J.L. 753, 67
A. 38 (1907).
120 See id. at 754, 67 A. at 39.
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Pitney also supported Jersey City's Progressive Republican
administration in two disputes with local street railway companies. In 1905, he ruled that the municipality could collect a license fee from the North Jersey Street Railway Company. 2 '
Two years later, Pitney upheld as reasonable a municipal regulatory ordinance requiring North Jersey and another company to
provide sufficient cars during rush hour so that all passengers
could have a seat and no one would have to wait more than five
12 2
minutes for a ride.
This latter decision reflected Pitney's desire to see corporations regulated and controlled. Although he could wax eloquent
about "the marvelous progress of the past half century in every
line of human effort, carried on ...more and more through the
instrumentality of corporations,"' 12 ' he deeply distrusted the increasing separation of ownership from control and the concentration of economic power into fewer and fewer hands, 1 24 two
factors that distinguished corporate evolution at the turn of the
century. His ideal corporation was a little democracy in which
directors were elected annually for limited terms, real power
rested with the shareholders, and minority rights were
respected. 25 An equity judge, Pitney thought, should use his
powers to preserve this ideal and at the same time to protect the
1 26
public from corporate abuses such as restraint of trade.
The nineteenth-century attitudes that permeated his corporation decisions also governed his approach to labor law. In the
121 See Mayor ofJersey City v. North Jersey St. Ry., 72 N.J.L. 383, 61 A. 95 (Sup.
Ct. 1905). The Company, a successor in interest to the Jersey City & Bergen Railroad Company, claimed that a supplement to the charter of the Jersey City & Bergen, passed by the legislature in 1867, exempted it from license fees imposed by a
local government. Id. at 387-88, 61 A. at 96. But cf. Fielders v. NorthJersey St. Ry.,
68 N.J.L. 343, 363, 53 A. 404, 411 (1902) (stating that an ordinance requiring street
railway companies to pave the portion of the street over which their tracks passed
was an illegal tax not justifiable as an exercise of the police power).
122 See North Jersey St. Ry. v. Mayor of Jersey City, 75 N.J.L. 349, 67 A. 1072
(Sup. Ct. 1907). At the end of his opinion in the NorthJersey case, Pitney announced
that a like result had been reached previously in a similar case. Id. at 354, 67 A. at
1074; see also State v. Atlantic City & S. R.R., 77 N.J.L. 465, 72 A. 111 (1909) (sustaining effort of the attorney general to forbid a railroad from owning stocks and
bonds of a street railway company).
123 See Warren v. Pim, 66 N.J. Eq. 353, 399, 59 A. 773, 790 (1904) (Pitney, J.,
concurring). In this case, Pitney was part of a seven-to-six majority that affirmed a
decision handed down by his father. See id. at 428, 59 A. at 802.
124 See id. at 364, 373, 378, 386-87, 59 A. at 777, 780, 782, 785 (Pitney, J.,
concurring).
125 See id. at 395-97, 59 A. at 789 (Pitney, J., concurring).
126 See 31 CONG. REC. 167 app. (1898).
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case of Brennan v. United Hatters, Local 17,127 Pitney expressed distaste for a union's claim that the value of belonging to it "consist[ed] in participation in a more or less complete monopoly of
the labor market in the particular trade in question." 128 He subsequently cited Brennan as holding that the state constitution
guaranteed a painter the "right to seek and gain employment in
his lawful occupation,"' 1 29 and added that, consequently, a union
"had no right to interfere with him in his employment merely
because he was not a member."'' 30 Finally, in George Jonas Glass
Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers'Association,13 1 Chancellor Pitney upheld 33a
sweeping injunction 32 issued by Vice Chancellor Bergen
73 N.J.L. 729, 65 A. 165 (1906).
Id. at 739, 65 A. at 169.
Levin v. Cosgrove, 75 N.J.L. 344, 347, 67 A. 1070, 1071 (Sup. Ct. 1907).
Id. at 347-48, 67 A. at 1071. It is not at all clear that this is really a holding of
Brennan; the reasoning in the opinion is extremely murky. See Brennan, 73 N.J.L. at
742-43, 65 A. at 170-71.
131 77 N.J. Eq. 219, 79 A. 262 (1908).
132 The injunction restrained the defendants as follows:
First. From knowingly and intentionally causing or attempting to
cause, by threats, offers of money, payments of money, offering to pay
expenses, or by inducement or persuasion, any employe of the complainant under contract to render service to it to break such contract by
quitting such service.
Second. From personal molestation of persons willing to be employed by complainant with intent to coerce such persons to refrain
from entering such employment.
Third. From addressing persons willing to be employed by complainant, against their will, and thereby causing them personal annoyance, with a view to persuade them to refrain from such employment.
Fourth. From loitering or picketing in the streets or on the highways
or public places near the premises of complainant with intent to procure
the personal molestation and annoyance of persons employed or willing
to be employed by complainant, and with a view to cause persons so
employed to refrain from such employment.
Fith. From entering the premises of the complainant against its will
with intent to interfere with its business.
Sixth. From violence, threats of violence, insults, indecent talk, abusive epithets, annoying language, acts or conduct, practiced upon any
persons without their consent, with intent to coerce them to refrain
from entering the employment of complainant or to leave its employment.
Seventh. From attempting to cause any persons employed by complainant to leave such employment by intimidating or annoying such
employes by annoying language, acts or conduct.
Eighth. From causing persons willing to be employed by complainant to refrain from so doing by annoying language, acts or conduct.
Ninth. From inducing, persuading or causing, or attempting to induce, persuade or cause, the employes of complainant to break their
contracts of service with complainant or quit their employment.
Tenth. From threatening to injure the business of any corporation,
127
128
129
130
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against a labor organization that had attempted to pressure an
employer into unionizing his factory. Besides instigating a strike
and a boycott and picketing the plant, the union apparently had
resorted to threats, intimidation, and even bribery to deprive Jonas Glass of a work force until the firm agreed to its demands.' 3 4
Pitney characterized the union's actions as "a war of subjugation
against the complainant corporation. '35 In issuing the injunction, Vice Chancellor Bergen was careful to emphasize that he
was not disputing the right of workers to form a union or to state
peacefully to others their position in a labor dispute. 136 Pitney,
on the other hand, expressed distaste for a state statute that appeared to legalize both unions and strikes. He declared that if
this law really permitted the use of peaceable measures to induce
workmen to quit their jobs or refuse to enter137someone's employment, it would have to be unconstitutional.
Because Pitney's hostility toward unions was inspired by
their tendency to monopolize in the labor market,' 38 it did not
extend to unorganized workers. In tort cases decided while he
was on the New Jersey bench, he ruled in favor of injured workmen about as often as he ruled against them. 139 He did once
customer or person dealing or transacting business and willing to deal
and transact business with the complainant, by making threats in writing
or by words for the purpose of coercing such corporation, customer or
person against his or its will so as not to deal with or transact business
with the complainant.
Id. at 221-22, 79 A. at 263.
133 See GeorgeJonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers Assoc., 72 N.J. Eq. 653, 66
A. 953 (Ch. 1907), aff'd, 77 N.J. Eq. 219, 79 A. 262 (1908).
134 See id. at 655, 66 A. at 954.
135 Jonas Glass, 77 N.J. Eq. at 221, 79 A. at 263.
136 George Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers Assoc., 72 N.J. Eq. 653, 662,
66 A. 953, 957 (Ch. 1907), afd, 77 N.J. Eq. 219, 79 A. 262 (1908).
137 See Jonas Glass, 77 N.J. Eq. at 224, 79 A. at 264. The statute read as follows:
That it shall not be unlawful for any two or more persons to unite, combine or bind themselves by oath, covenant, agreement, alliance or otherwise, to persuade, advise, or encourage, by peaceable means, any person
or persons to enter into any combination for or against leaving or entering into the employment of any person, persons or corporation.
Act of Feb. 14, 1883, ch. 28, § 1, 1883 N.J. Laws 36, 36. In a mildly critical editorial, the Newark Evening News argued that Pitney had not overlooked this statute, but
had ignored the strikers' "constitutional rights of personal liberty and free speech."
Newark Evening News, Feb. 15, 1911, in Pitney Papers, supra note 38.
138 See Jonas Glass, 77 N.J. Eq. at 224, 79 A. at 264.
139 See infra notes 140-142 and accompanying text. He ruled for workers three
times and against them four times. See id. If one discounts Delaney v. Public Serv.
Ry., 82 N.J.L. 551, 552, 82 A. 852, 852 (1912), in which he affirmed a nonsuit
because the plaintiff had presented no evidence of the defendant's negligence beyond the fact that its pneumatic jack had injured him, there is an even split.
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make rather heartless use of the doctrine of contributory negligence, employing it to reverse a jury verdict in favor of a fourteen-year-old boy whose hand had been crushed in his
employer's machine.1 40 In another case, Pitney declined to adopt
the so-called vice-principal exception to the fellow-servant rule,
thus precluding a telephone lineman from recovering against his
employer for injuries caused by the negligence of his foreman. 141
On the other hand, he consistently took the position that employers must furnish their employees with safe tools and a safe place
in which to work, and he would not allow those who failed to do
so to avoid liability by hiding behind the fellow-servant doctrine. 14 2 In viewing workers favorably while loathing their orga'
"[F]or many a progressive
nizations, Pitney was not unique. 43
the rise of the labor union was as frightening as the rise of
trusts."1

44

Pitney's hostility to unions placed him squarely within the
mainstream of the Progressive movement, as did his support of
governmental efforts to regulate saloons 45 and to combat other
forms of vice.' 4 6 In addition, Pitney impressed Progressives by
prodding a Hudson County grand jury into indicting for election
fraud some opponents of Jersey City's New Idea mayor, Mark
Fagan, men who, according to the Newark Evening News, had
140 See Diehl v. Standard Oil Co., 70 N.J.L. 424, 57 A. 131 (Sup. Ct. 1904). The
decision in Gill v. National Storage Co., 70 N.J.L. 53, 56 A. 146 (Sup. Ct. 1903),
seems also to be based on the doctrine of contributory negligence, but it may rest
on the principle of assumption of the risk; the opinion is extremely unclear.
141 See Knutter v. New York & N.J. Tel. Co., 67 N.J.L. 646, 52 A. 565 (1902).
142 See Burns v. Delaware & Atl. Tel. Co., 70 N.J.L. 745, 59 A. 220 (1904); Hopwood v. Benjamin Atha & Illingsworth Co., 68 N.J.L. 707, 54 A. 435 (1903); Smith
v. Erie R.R., 67 N.J.L. 636, 52 A. 634 (1902).
143 See generally R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 20, at 238 (Progressives "[o]n one side
... feared the power of the plutocracy [and] on the other the poverty and restlessness of the masses").
144 G. MOWRY, supra note 19, at 99-100.
145 See, e.g., Meehan v. Board of Excise Comm'rs, 75 N.J.L. 557, 70 A. 363 (1908)
(upholding constitutionality of "Bishops' Law," which required interiors of taverns
to be in full view from public street during hours when sale of liquor was forbidden
by law); Croker v. Board of Excise Comm'rs, 73 N.J.L. 460, 63 A. 901 (Sup. Ct.
1906) (upholding municipal ordinances designed to keep saloons closed on Sunday); Bachman v. Inhabitants of Phillipsburg, 68 N.J.L. 552, 53 A. 620 (Sup. Ct.
1902) (holding license issued to proprietor of beer saloon should be set aside because it had been obtained through fraud). The hostility of Progressives toward
saloons arose from a belief that immigrants drank too much. See A. LINK & R. McCORMICK, supra note 6, at 102-03.
146 See, e.g., Ames v. Kirby, 71 N.J.L. 442, 59 A. 558 (Sup. Ct. 1904) (upholding
jailing of Atlantic county man for bookmaking). See generally A. LINK & R. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 68-69 (discussing society's weakness of character).
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"concocted" a "conspiracy to override the will of the people."'' 47
A charge to a Passaic County grand jury also attracted favorable
attention. In it, Pitney lashed out at local officials for failing to
enforce the liquor laws and called for action against election officers in 48Paterson, who were alleged to have submitted false
returns.1

His judicial support for causes dear to their hearts made him
politically appealing to Progressives. 149 In 1906, some Morris
County friends launched a campaign to elect Pitney to the United
States Senate.150 Their bandwagon never really got rolling, however, and even his hometown backers finally abandoned it in the
legislature. Nevertheless, Essex County's New Idea senator, Everett Colby, stuck with Pitney all the way by both nominating and
voting for him.' 5 1
In the summer of 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt, then
emerging as an outspoken champion of Progressivism, 152 encouraged New Jersey Republicans to nominate Pitney for governor. 153 That idea appealed to a Jersey City "Colbyite," who was
impressed by the fact that the justice had made the railroads pay
an additional $4,000,000 in taxes. 154 Pitney, however, did not
get the gubernatorial nomination, despite being regarded as an
acceptable candidate by a great majority of those who identified
themselves with the New Idea movement. 155 He continued to be
mentioned as a prospect for the governorship, though, and when
Democrat Woodrow Wilson ran for that office in 1910, he
Newark Evening News, Nov. 2, 1907, in Pitney Papers, supra note 38.
See Clipping from unidentified newspaper, Jan. 10, 1907, in Pitney Papers,
supra note 38.
149 Although his judicial rulings clearly served to enhance his political appeal,
Pitney insisted in 1912 that he had never allowed politics to influence his decisions.
"[H]e had simply considered what he believed to be the justice of the case and
acted accordingly." Jersey's Honor, supra note 109, at 143.
150 See Letter from Frederick Gordon to the Editor of the Newark Evening News
(Jan. 11, 1907), in Pitney Papers, supra note 38. The Evening News commented favorably on Pitney as a possible Senatorial candidate. Newark Evening News, Sept.
4, 1906, in Pitney Papers, supra note 38.
151 R. NOBLE, JR., supra note 87, at 83 n. 59; see TheJerseyman, Jan. 25, 1907, in
Pitney Papers, supra note 38.
152 See G. MOWRY, supra note 19, at 210-12, 218-20 (discussing Roosevelt's "Progressive" steps).
153 See Newark Public Ledger, Aug. 10 (year unidentified), in Pitney Papers, supra
note 38.
154 See Letter to the Editor of the New York Times, Aug. 9, 1907, in Pitney Papers,
supra note 38.
155 See Newark Evening News, July 27, 1907, in Pitney Papers, supra note 38.
147

148
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thought his classmate might well be his opponent."'
IV. SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
A. Appointment
Pitney was headed not for the governor's office in Trenton,
but for the Supreme Court in Washington. Although President
William Howard Taft considered him for one of three open seats
on the Court in 1910,'
he ultimately gave those positions to
158
other men.
Taft returned to Pitney after Associate Justice
John Marshall Harlan died in October of 1911, but the chancellor
was not his first choice for that appointment. 1 59 Scholars have
never satisfactorily explained why the President finally chose
160
Pitney for the Harlan seat.
Perhaps the most important reason was his broad political
appeal. During the early months of 1912, Taft was locked in a
fight for control of the Republican party with his predecessor,
156 See undated clipping from unidentified 1910 newspaper, in Pitney Papers,
supra note 38. In 1915, Morris County Republicans sought to promote the idea of a
Pitney Presidential candidacy. See Newark Evening News, Nov. 24, 1915, in Pitney
Papers, supra note 38. The Justice, however, then serving on the United States
Supreme Court, released a letter to them saying he could not see his way clear to
permit the use of his name as a candidate. See Newark Evening News, Nov. 30,
1915, in Pitney Papers, supra note 38.
157 See Letter from William H. Taft to James E. Howell (Sept. 15, 1910), in Pitney
Papers, supra note 38. On September 15, 1910, President Taft wrote to Vice Chancellor James E. Howell of the court of chancery in Newark, whom he had contacted
earlier about the qualifications ofJustice Francis Swayze. See id. He had put Swayze
on the eligible list and now wanted "to get [Howell's] judgment as to the comparative ability ofJustice Swayze and Chancellor Pitney; also a statement as to ... their
ages." Id.
158 Willis Van Devanter was named to the Associate Justiceship vacated by Edward D. White when the latter was elevated to ChiefJustice. Joseph R. Lamar replaced William Moody, and Charles Evans Hughes was named to the seat formerly
held by David J. Brewer. See generally 9 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE JUDICIARY AND RESPONSIBLE

Gov-

ERNMENT 1910-21, at 3-85 (1984) (chapter entitled "Mr. Taft Rehabilitates the
Court").
159 See infra notes 163-169 and accompanying text.
160 Fred Israel attributes the appointment to the impression that Pitney made on
Taft when they met at a dinner in Newark the week before the appointment was
made. See Israel, supra note 4, at 2003. Henry J. Abraham attributes it to political
strategy related to the struggle between Taft and Theodore Roosevelt for the 1912
Republican nomination, but he fails to explain the relationship between the two
satisfactorily.

See H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF

APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT 162-63 (1974).

After extensive research,
the late Professor Alexander Bickel concluded, "The origins and the method of the
Pitney selection are not discoverable." A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., supra note
158, at 326.
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Theodore Roosevelt, who was seeking to deny him renomination
and to capture the top spot on the GOP ticket for himself.' 6 1 The
President and his political strategists believed that New Jersey
1 62
Ulticould become a crucial battleground in this contest.
mately, this belief proved decisive in Taft's choice of a replacement for Harlan.
The President first offered the appointment to his Secretary
of State, Frank Knox, who declined the honor.' 6 3 For several
months after that, the leading contenders appeared to be Secretary of Commerce and Labor Charles Nagel and Judge William
C. Hook of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Nagel
lost out because he was too old, lacked prior judicial experience, 1 64 and had made himself unpopular with labor by supporting immigration. 16 5 Some people objected to Hook because of
his concurrence in a decision upholding an Oklahoma statute
that allowed railroads to provide sleeping, dining, and chair cars
for whites without making comparable facilities available to
blacks.' 66 Others disliked his issuance of an injunction prohibiting the city of Denver from constructing a new water plant and
"requir[ing] it instead to buy [out] a private water company
whose franchise had expired."'' 6 7 In addition, state railroad commissioners and Progressive governors from western states com161 See A. LINK, supra note 18, at 468-69. Although Roosevelt had hand-picked
Taft to succeed him, he became dissatisfied with his choice when Taft drifted in a
conservative direction, coming into increasing conflict with the Progressive insurgents in Congress. See W. HARBAUGH, LIFE AND TIMES OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT
402 (new rev. ed. 1963).
162 See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 160, at 163.
163 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., supra note 158, at 318-19. Knox had also declined an appointment to the Supreme Court offered to him by Roosevelt, and Taft
did not really expect the Secretary to accept at this time. See id.
164 Id. at 326.
165 H. ABRAHAM, supra note 160, at 163. Nagel's first wife was Louis Brandeis's
sister. A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., supra note 158, at 326 n.26.
166 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., supra note 158, at 322-24. The case was McCabe
v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 186 F. 966 (8th Cir. 1911), aff'd, 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
Hook's association with that decision made it likely that his nomination would add
to the race-related political problems the administration was already experiencing
in Oklahoma. See A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., supra note 158, at 323-24. The
administration had previously refused to challenge the disfranchisement of black
voters by a grandfather clause in Oklahoma, and it later acquiesced in an unauthorized prosecution attacking that device brought by an insubordinate Republican
United States Attorney. Id. at 323.
167 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., supra note 158, at 321. The case was City of
Denver v. New York Trust Co., 187 F. 890 (8th Cir. 1911), rev'd, 229 U.S. 123
(1913).
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16
plained that Hook's approach to rate making was prorailroad. 1
That was not the sort of nominee Taft needed at a time when he
was laboring to keep Progressives from deserting to the
Roosevelt camp. 169
Pitney was. Franklin Murphy, a former governor of New
Jersey and then the state's Republican National Committeeman,
pushed him for the job. Murphy was a strong Taft supporter, 17 0
and because he hoped to be selected as his running mate, he was
anxious to ingratiate himself with the President. Taft was scheduled to give a speech in New York City in February of 1912. With
the objective of promoting his political fortunes in New Jersey,
Murphy arranged for Taft to stop over in Newark on the way
there to attend a luncheon at the ex-governor's home and a Republican reception at the Essex County Country Club.' 7 1 At
17 2
Murphy's house, the President sat next to Chancellor Pitney.
They had a pleasant conversation, 1 73 and a week later, on February 19th, Taft offered the chancellor a seat on the Supreme
74
Court. 1
Pitney was in many ways just what the President had been
looking for. He was an experienced judge, but at fifty-four, he
still had many years of judicial work before him. 1 75 In addition,
he was from the Third Circuit, which had been unrepresented on
the Supreme Court for a number of years.' 7 6 A desire to correct
that situation was one of the reasons Taft had approached Knox,

A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., supra note 158, at 320-21. The decision to which
the governors and railroad commissioners particularly objected was Missouri, Kan.
& Tex. Ry. v. Love, 177 F. 493 (W.D. Okla. 1910), aFd, 185 F. 321 (8th Cir. 1911).
169 See generally W. HARBAUGH, supra note 161, at 401-06.
170 See N.J. Journal, Feb. 21, 1912, in Pitney Papers, supra note 38 (stating Murphy was a Taft delegate at the Republican National Convention).
171 See N.J. Journal, Jan. 22, 1912, in Pitney Papers, supra note 38; N.J. Journal,
Feb. 12, 1912, in Pitney papers, supra note 38.
172 A. Breed, supra note 41, at 22.
173 Id. at 23. Pitney and Taft had met earlier, once having played golf together at
Chevy Chase, Maryland. Id. at 22. The game of golf would continue to provide
something of a bond between them after Pitney's appointment. See Letter from
Mahlon Pitney to the President (June 18, 1912), in Pitney Papers, supra note 38 ("I
wrote last week from Washington to Messrs Von Lengerke & Detmold, Fifth Ave.
Bldg., New York City, from whom I buy my golfing supplies, asking them to send
you a dozen small size Zome Zodiacs.").
174 See Letter from William H. Taft to Mahlon Pitney (Feb. 19, 1912), in Pitney
Papers, supra note 38. While the two of them were driving from Newark to New
York on February 12th, Taft told Murphy that he would likely appoint Pitney. A
Breed, supra note 41, at 23.
175 See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 160, at 163;J. SEMONCHE, CHARTING THE FUTURE
267 (1978).
176 See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 160, at 163.
168
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and only reluctantly had he turned his attention to candidates
from further west.' 7 7 After dining with Pitney, the President, a
former judge himself,178 spent several hours reading a number of
his opinions.179 These apparently confirmed a favorable assessment of Pitney's abilities that Taft had received from New Jersey
Vice ChancellorJames E. Howell in 1910."80 Finally, Pitney was
from New Jersey. Taft had become convinced that he had to
name someone from that state. 18 1
Although the chancellor satisfied many of the President's
other criteria, political considerations eventually earned him a
seat on the Supreme court. Taft considered at least three other
New Jersey judges, 182 among them Pitney's friend Justice
Swayze.' 8 ' Swayze, who was Governor Murphy's initial choice
for the job, had the support of United States Senator Frank 0.
Briggs i8 4 and even the chancellor himself.185 Howell had advised
the President, however, that Pitney was preferable because of his
more extensive involvement in politics. 18 6 Eventually, Pitney became Murphy's choice.' 87 The ex-governor was a conservative
who considered the Progressive movement dangerous, but he
recognized the value of appeasing those Republicans who were
attracted to it because they needed their vote. 8 8 Thus, he invited two or three Progressives, among them Senator Colby, to
B. SCHMIDT, JR., supra note 158, at 318-19.
178 Taft had been a judge on the Ohio Superior Court from 1887 to 1890 and a
judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit from 1892 to
1900. A. MASON, WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT: CHIEF JUSTICE 12 (1964).
179 A. Breed, supra note 41, at 23.
180 See Letter from James E. Howell to William H. Taft (Sept. 15, 1910), in Pitney
Papers, supra note 38.
181 See Jersey's Honor, supra note 109, at 143-44.
177 See A. BICKEL &

182 See id. at 140.
183 J. SEMONCHE, supra note 175, at 266. Semonche claims that Swayze was the
leading contender from New Jersey. Id. Certainly, that is what Pitney thought. See
A. Breed, supra note 41, at 22.
184 See A. Breed, supra note 41, at 26-27.
185 Id. at 22. Briggs was also a Taft supporter. See id. at 26-27. According to
Robert McCarter, Murphy at first urged Taft to appoint Swayze. Taft responded by
offering to appoint Swayze to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. R. MCCARTER, supra note 52, at 85.
186 Letter from James E. Howell to William H. Taft, supra note 180. After
Pitney's selection was announced, the New York Times reported, "The appointment
of the Chancellor, who has long been a prominent figure in New Jersey politics, will
tend, it is thought, to throw the influence of New Jersey leaders to the President."
N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1912, in Pitney Papers, supra note 38.
187 See N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1912, in Pitney Papers, supra note 38; see also A.
Breed, supra note 41, at 22 (Murphy and Pitney were close friends).
188 R. NOBLE, JR., supra note 87, at 23.
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his luncheon, an event arranged to generate enthusiasm for the
Taft movement. 18 9 The appointment of Pitney was almost certainly another move of the same kind, intended to curry favor
with the New Idea men and thus help Taft retain control of the
New Jersey Republican party.' 90
Reaction to the nomination from within the state was extremely positive,' 9 ' and Governor Wilson commended Taft's
choice.' 9 2 To the rest of the Country, however, Pitney "was 'an
unknown quantity.' "193 The New York Times nevertheless predicted that the Senate would quickly and easily confirm him.' 94
The Times was wrong. First, the president of the Iowa Federation of Labor protested the Pitney appointment to Senators
from his state.' 95 He failed to substantiate his objections, however, because his argument was based on Frank & Dugan v. Herold. 19 6 As the nominee swiftly pointed out, the Pitney who had
granted a sweeping injunction against picketing and other union
activity in that case was his father.' 97 Mahlon Pitney claimed not
to be an enemy of labor, 198 and the president of the New Jersey
Federation of Labor, who was also a Hudson County assemblyman, supported him, claiming to be unable to recall any decision
by the chancellor that had borne heavily against union inter189 See A. Breed, supra note 41, at 22.
190 Bickel asserts that Taft "decided to nominate Pitney in the teeth of the
Progressives." A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., supra note 158, at 328. Bickel is guilty
of reading history backward, however, assuming that Taft knew at the time he made
the appointment the sort of controversy that it would ignite. See infra notes 195-206
and accompanying text. He also views the opposition to Pitney's confirmation as
more Progressive than it was. See infra note 206 and accompanying text. Pitney was
a close friend of the conservative Franklin Murphy. A. Breed, supra note 41, at 22.
Murphy probably regarded him as a true conservative, like himself and the President, but someone appealing enough to Progressives to attract support for Taft
from the New Idea wing of the party. That is probably what he told the President
during the latter's Newark visit, and it is likely what Taft had in mind when he made
the appointment. See supra notes 170-174 and accompanying text.
In Washington, political observers commented that the Pitney appointment
would have a sharp bearing on the political contest for control of NewJersey, which
would be developing within the next few weeks, and that it would help Taft hold
the state against the Roosevelt supporters who were "set[ting] things in line" to
give NewJersey's delegates to their man. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1912, in Pitney
Papers, supra note 38.
191 See A. Breed, supra note 41, at 30-31.
192

193

Id. at 32.
A. BICKEL & B.

SCHMIDT, JR.,

supra note 158, at 329.

N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1912, in Pitney Papers, supra note 38.
A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., supra note 158, at 329.
196 63 N.J. Eq. 443, 52 A. 152 (Ch. 1901).
197 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., supra note 158, at 330.
198 Id. at 330 n.41.
194
195
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ests.19 9 He apparently had forgottenJonas Glass. When the Senate took up the nomination on March 8th, Charles A. Culberson,
a Texas Democrat, raised objections to theJonas Glass decision.2 0 0
It aroused enough controversy that the Senate had the opinion
printed.20 ' For three days, Senators read and debate raged.20 2 At
one point during the executive sessions on the nomination,
Pitney's supporters reportedly lacked sufficient votes for confirmation.20 3 Governor Wilson, Senator James E. Martine, and
other leading New Jersey Democrats sprang to the defense of
their state's native son, 20 4 and on March 13th, the Senate approved Taft's choice by a vote of fifty to twenty-six. 2 5 The division was basically along partisan lines, although four Insurgent
20 6
Republicans did join twenty-two Democrats in voting "no.
B. Supreme Court Decisions
Five days later, Pitney took the oath of office, 20 7 beginning a
tenure on the Supreme Court that would last for just under
eleven years. 20 8 A durable Justice, he was seldom absent from
the Bench, participating in all but nineteen of the 2412 decisions
that the Court rendered during his tenure.20 9 Pitney authored a
total of 268 opinions, speaking for the majority on 244 occasions,
2 10
dissenting 19 times, and writing 5 concurrences.
A. Breed, supra note 41, at 3 1-32.
A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., supra note 158, at 331; N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1912,
in Pitney Papers, supra note 38; see also supra notes 131-137 and accopanying text
(discussing Pitney's opinion inJonas Glass).
201 48 CONG. REC. 3011 (1912).
202 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., supra note 158, at 331.
203 See Newark News, Mar. 13, 1912, in Pitney Papers, supra note 38.
204 See id.; A. Breed, supra note 41, at 33.
205 Newark News, Mar. 13, 1912, in Pitney Papers, supra note 38.
206 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., supra note 158, at 332. Although four Insurgent
(Progressive) Republicans voted against Pitney, one of his leading supporters in the
Senate confirmation debates was William E. Borah of Idaho, also an Insurgent.
Professor Bickel somewhat grudgingly acknowledges that "[the] Insurgents did not
unite against him." Id. Earlier, Bickel implies that they should have done so
beause Pitney was supported by the president of the National Association of Manufacturers. See id. at 329. What he fails to point out is that this endorsement came
only after "labor agitation" had nearly defeated Pitney in the Senate. See generally A.
Breed, supra note 41, at 33-36 (discussing Senate debates on Pitney's labor
positions).
207 See A. Breed, supra note 41, at 36.
208 See Israel, supra note 4, at 2004. Pitney served for 10 years, 9 months, and 12
days. Id.
209 Id.
210 Id.
199

200
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1. Taxation
For lawyers practicing today, Pitney's most important opinion is Eisner v. Macomber.2 1 1 In that case, he defined income for
purposes of the sixteenth amendment, drawing the line between
those additions to wealth that were subject to the Federal income
tax and those that were not. 2 12 The specific question in Eisner
was whether stock dividends constituted taxable income.2 13 Congress had passed a law in 1916 treating them as if they did,2 14 but
the financial community expected the Court to hold that measure
unconstitutional. Early in his opinion, Pitney explained the intent of the disputed act.2 1 5 Apparently, he mumbled as he did
so.

2 16

An agent for Dow Jones misunderstood him as saying not

that Congress had sought to tax stock dividends as income, but
that the Court was holding it had the power to do this. 2 17 The
Dow Jones man rushed out to wire the news to Wall Street.2 1
The result was a brief plunge in stock prices.2 19 When the false
report was corrected, however, the market recovered what it had
lost and more. 2
The stock market's favorable reaction to Pitney's actual opinion probably did not surprise Justice Louis Brandeis. In a strong
dissent, he charged, "If stock dividends representing profits are
held exempt from taxation under the Sixteenth Amendment, the
owners of the most successful businesses in America will . . .be
able to escape taxation on a large part of what is actually their
income." 22' Brandeis's Populist rhetoric was nearly as unjustified a reaction to Pitney's opinion as the collapse of stock prices.
Informed observers recognized that Eisner had not created much
of an opportunity for the distribution of tax-free profits, and virtually all of the voluminous scholarly literature that the case gen252 U.S. 189 (1920).
Pitney wrote that income was "not a gain accruing to capital, not a growth or
increment of value in the investment; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable
value proceedingfrom the property, severed from the capital however invested or employed, and coming in, being 'derived', that is, received or drawn by the recipient (the
taxpayer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal." Id. at 207.
213 Id. at 199.
214 See Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 756, 757 (current version at
26 U.S.C. § 61 (Supp. 11 1984)).
215 See Eisner, 252 U.S. at 201-05.
216 See A. BIcKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., supra note 158, at 508.
217 See id.
218 Id.
211
212

219 See id.
220 Id. at 509.
221

Eisner, 252 U.S. at 237 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

1986]

MR. JUSTICE PITNEY

407

2 22
erated supported Pitney's position.
That is hardly surprising, for the Justice from New Jersey
had become something of a tax specialist. Eisner was only one of
six majority opinions that he wrote explicating the concept of income as it related to the sixteenth amendment. 2 23 Pitney also
spoke for the Court in cases involving Federal taxation of corporations, 224 inheritances, 2 25 and imports. 22 6 In addition, he wrote
a total of twenty majority opinions 2 27 and one dissent 228 dealing
with various constitutional issues raised by state tax measures.

2. Labor Unions
Although Pitney devoted more attention to taxation than to
any other subject, as one of his biographers has pointed out, "It
is in the area of labor decisions... that the Justice made his most
222 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., supra note 158, at 509. On the other hand, the
Supreme Court was "unquestionably ready in the next generation to overrule Eisner
v. Macomber, [but] could not find the occasion to do so." Id.
It is not surprising that Pitney defined income restrictively and thus limited
what the National Government could tax under the sixteenth amendment. New
Jersey had refused to ratify that amendment. See A. LINK, supra note 18, at 267-68.
Governor Wilson had supported it, and the assembly had passed it without a dissenting vote in 1911. Id. The Senate, which was controlled by Pitney's Republican
party, had refused to go along, however. Id.
223 See, e.g., Miles v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 259 U.S. 247 (1922); Rockefeller v.
United States, 257 U.S. 176 (1921); United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156 (1921);
Peabody v. Eisner, 247 U.S. 347 (1918); Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339 (1918);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 330 (1918).
224 See, e.g., LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377 (1921); United
States v. Cleveland, C.C. & St. L. Ry., 247 U.S. 195 (1918); Hays v. Gauley Mountain Coal Co., 247 U.S. 189 (1918); Anderson v. Forty-Two Broadway Co., 239 U.S.
69 (1915); Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913);
McCoach v. Minehill & S.H.R.R., 228 U.S. 295 (1913).
225 See, e.g., United States v. Field, 255 U.S. 257 (1921).
226 See, e.g., St. Louis, J.M. & S. Ry. v.J.F. Hasty & Sons, 255 U.S. 252 (1921).
227 See, e.g., Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U.S. 466 (1922); Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Durr,
257 U.S. 99 (1921); Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642 (1921); F.S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg.
Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920); Wagner v. City of
Covington, 251 U.S. 95 (1919); American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U.S. 459
(1919); Mackay Tel. & Cable Co. v. City of Little Rock, 250 U.S. 94 (1919); Leary v.
Mayor ofJersey City, 248 U.S. 328 (1918); Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Newport,
247 U.S. 464 (1918); United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321
(1918); Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292 (1917); Illinois Cent. R.R. v.
Greene, 244 U.S. 555 (1917); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Greene, 244 U.S. 22 (1917);
Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R., 244 U.S. 499 (1917); St. Louis S.W. Ry. v.
Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350 (1914); Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Brickell, 233 U.S. 304
(1914); Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U.S. 576 (1914); United States Fidelity Co. v. Kentucky, 231 U.S. 394 (1913).
228 See Union Tank Line v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275, 287 (1919) (Pitney, J.,
dissenting).
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significant contribution. "229 These were also the opinions that
earned him his reactionary reputation. 2 30

As a member of the

Supreme Court, Pitney continued to exhibit the hostility toward
unions that he had displayed on the New Jersey bench. 23 ' In a
1915 case known as Coppage v. Kansas,2 3 2 he held unconstitutional
a state statute that made it unlawful for employers to require
their workers, as a condition of employment, to agree not to join
a labor organization. 21 3 Pitney insisted that he was not questioning "the legitimacy of such organizations," but added, "Conceding the full right of the individual to join [a] union, he has no
inherent right to do this and still remain in the employ of one
who is unwilling to employ a union man. "234 Pitney viewed the
Kansas statute as one designed for "leveling inequalities of fortune" through "an interference with the normal exercise of personal liberty and property rights . . . and not an incident to the
advancement of the general welfare. ' 2 35 Not even a national

emergency, he argued in a later case, could justify legislative interference with management's freedom to negotiate with its
workers for the employment terms it wanted.236
Pitney's antistatist attitudes did not cut both ways. Although
hostile to governmental interference with employers' freedom of
action, he generally gave enthusiastic support to governmental
interference with the liberty of unions. Pitney remained a champion of the labor injunction. In Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal,23 7 he
argued unsuccessfully that open-shop sash and door manufactur229

Israel, supra note 4, at 2004.

230

SeeJ.

231

See Levitan, Mahlon Pitney-LaborJudge, 40

232

236 U.S. 1 (1915).

SEMONCHE,

supra note 175, at 298.
VA.

L.

REV.

733, 748 (1954).

233 Id. at 26. Such agreements were commonly referred to as "yellow-dog contracts." In striking down this statute, Pitney relied on an earlier case in which the
Court had invalidated a Federal statute outlawing yellow-dog contracts for railroad
workers. See id. at 9-18 (citing Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908)). For a
criticism of both Coppage and Adair, see Powell, Collective BargainingBefore the Supreme
Court, 33 POL. Sci. Q. 396 (1918).
234 Coppage, 236 U.S. at 19.
235 Id. at 18.
236 See Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 377 (1917) (Pitney,J., dissenting). In order
to prevent a nationwide strike by several railway unions during a period of increasing military preparedness prior to American entry into World War I, Congress had
reduced the workday for the railroad industry to eight hours, but had provided that
railroad workers should continue to receive the same pay they had gotten for working longer hours. See generally Belknap, The New Deal and the Emergency Powers Doctrine, 62 TEX. L. REV. 67, 79-81 (1983) (discussing the Wilson case and the national
emergency powers doctrine).
237 244 U.S. 459, 472 (1917) (Pitney, J., dissenting).
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ers were entitled under the Sherman Antitrust Act 23a to have a
Federal court enjoin a boycott of their products by the Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners and certain unionized firms.
Later, as a spokesman for the majority in Hitchman Coal & Coke Co.
v. Mitchell, 2 39 Pitney held that a coal-mining company that had
required its employees to agree to work on a nonunion basis
might have a Federal district court restrain the United Mine
Workers from trying to organize its labor force. 4 ° In a revealing
passage, he declared: "Defendants' acts cannot be justified by
any analogy to competition in trade. They are not competitors of
plaintiff; and if they were their conduct exceeds the bounds of
fair trade."' 24 1 Pitney believed that a union had no right to reduce an employer's freedom of choice through economic coercion, although he regarded it as perfectly acceptable for
management to limit the independence of workers by making
them agree not to join a union in order to obtain a desperately
needed job.2 4 2 Hitchman Coal and Eagle Glass & Manufacturing Co.
v. Rowe,2 43 which was decided the same day on Hitchman Coal's
authority, exhibit what one commentator has characterized as a
"zeal bordering on vindictiveness in an effort to strike at

labor.'

'244

Despite his deep and long-standing hostility toward unions,
Pitney wound up supporting their position in his last labor law
decision. The New Jersey Justice gave no preliminary indication
that he would soon support a judicial inroad on the formidable
restrictions on organized labor and union activity that he had
helped to erect. Speaking for the Court in a January 1921 case
called Duplex PrintingPress Co. v. Deering,2 4 5 he upheld the action
of a Federal district court, which had enjoined a secondary boycott organized by the International Association of Machinists in
an effort to force a manufacturer to unionize.24 6 Pitney ruled this
way despite the fact that the district court had based its injunction on the antitrust laws.2 4 7 He refused to acknowledge that by
238 Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1982)).
239 245 U.S. 229 (1917).
240 Id. at 261-62.
241 Id. at 259.
242 See Powell, supra note 233, at 421-22.
243 245 U.S. 275 (1917).
244 Levitan, supra note 231, at 744.
245 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
246 Id. at 478-79.
247 See id. at 461.
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enacting section 20 of the Clayton Act 24 8 in 1914, Congress had
made conduct of the type in which the machinists had engaged
lawful and nonenjoinable under those statutes. Justice Brandeis
responded with a powerful dissent in which he argued that rights
were subordinate to the interests of the community and that how
far "industrial combatants" might push their struggle was something for the community's representatives in the legislature to
decide and "not for judges to determine. "249 Certainly that had
never been Pitney's view, but he was not a man who clung to his
own conclusions out of vanity, and he could be persuaded by
study to change his mind.2 50
Twelve months later, in Truax v. Corrigan,2 5 ' the New Jersey
Justice adopted Brandeis's position. Taft, who was then Chief
Justice, assigned Pitney to write an opinion invalidating an Arizona statute that forbade the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes. Pitney soon received a memorandum from Brandeis
opposing the decision, which he "read with interest. ' 25 2 The
New Jersey justice then changed his vote, joining his critic in dissent. 2 5 3 Pitney's opinion suggested his sympathies still lay with
businessmen seeking assistance from the courts rather than with
unions, 2 54 and he declined to endorse "the wisdom, or policy, or
propriety" of the Arizona law. 25 It now seemed clear to him that
the labor injunction could be abolished "in the normal exercise
25 6
of the legislative power of the State.
248 Ch. 323, § 20, 38 Stat. 730, 738 (1914) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 52
(1982)).
249 Duplex Printing, 254 U.S. at 488 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
250 See A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., supra note 158, at 585.
251 257 U.S. 312 (1921).
252 Letter from Mahlon Pitney to Mr. Justice Brandeis (Nov. 3, 1920), in Louis D.
Brandeis Papers, folder 14, manuscript box 114 (available at Harvard Law School
Library) [hereinafter cited as Brandeis Papers]. In a note on the back of a memorandum on Truax v. Cornigan, which he wrote sometime during the 1920 Term,
Pitney stated: "At the last Term the conference voted to reverse, and opinion was
allotted to me. Being unable, on further examination, to write in accordance with
the vote, I circulated this Memorandum as a report." Memorandum by Justice
Pitney in No. 72, Oct. Term 1920, in Brandeis Papers, supra, folder 9, manuscript
box 7.
253 Conversations between L.D.B. and F.F., in Brandeis Papers, supra note 252,
folder 14, manuscript box 114; see Truax, 257 U.S. at 344 (Pitney, J., dissenting).
254 See Truax, 257 U.S. at 346-47 (Pitney, J., dissenting).
255 Id. at 349 (Pitney, J., dissenting).
256 Id. at 348 (Pitney, J., dissenting). Somewhat earlier, Theodore Roosevelt
had evolved from a defender to an opponent of the labor injunction. See J. LURIE,
LAW AND THE NATION, 1865-1912, at 59 (1983). During the period from 1894 to
1896, he denounced those who opposed this device, but by 1901 through 1902, he
endorsed the right of labor as well as the right of capital to combine. See id. at 59-
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3. Industrial Accidents
Pitney's dissent in Truax "demonstrates that it would be an
'
Although
error to dismiss him simply as an antilabor judge."2 57
too oriented toward the individualistic world of the nineteenth
century to appreciate that unions might be necessary
counterweights to rapidly expanding aggregates of capital
(whose legitimacy he also could not accept), the Justice from New
Jersey did have some understanding of America's emergent industrial society. Like a number of his colleagues on the Supreme
Court, he was willing, where union activity was not involved, to
give a wide berth to state labor regulations.258 Thus, for example, Pitney wrote opinions upholding the constitutionality of Missouri 2 59 and Oklahoma 26 ° statutes that required employers to

give workers who either quit or were fired letters setting forth the
nature and duration of their service and the reasons for its
termination.
Like his Truax dissent, both of these decisions came near the
end of his service on the Supreme Court. Much earlier, however,
in cases arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA) and state workers' compensation statutes, Pitney had displayed the sympathy for unorganized workers already apparent
during his years as a New Jersey judge. Compensating laborers
injured in the course of their employment, which was the purpose of these laws, was a long-standing Progressive objective,
which he supported every bit as vigorously as did such outspoken
champions of reform as Theodore Roosevelt.2 6 '
Four years before Pitney's appointment to the Supreme
Court, Congress had enacted the FELA,2 6 2 a statute that abolished the fellow-servant rule in cases where interstate railroad
61. By 1907, Roosevelt admitted that there were good reasons for some of the
attacks that had been leveled at the labor injunction, and in 1908, he sent a special
message to Congress denouncing the way some judges used their power to issue
injunctions. Id. at 62-63.
257 Levitan, supra note 231, at 748.
258 See id. at 752.
259 See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922).
260 See Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Perry, 259 U.S. 548 (1922).
261 On the attitudes of Roosevelt, Congress, and the Progressive movement concerning compensation for the victims of industrial accidents, see A. BICKEL & B.
SCHMIDT, JR., supra note 158, at 205-13. See generally Friedman & Ladinsky, Social
Change and the Law of IndustrialAccidents, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 50 (1967).
262 Ch. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (1908) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60
(1982)).
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workers sued their employers for on-the-job injuries. 263

The

FELA also greatly modified for purposes of such litigation two
264
other common employers' defenses-contributory negligence
and assumption of the risk. 265 During his tenure on the Court,
Pitney decided a total of sixteen cases arising under the FELA.
Twelve times he ruled in favor of the injured worker or his estate.2 6 6 In two of the cases that the railroad won, the issue before
the Court was not whether the railroad was liable, but only
whether the damages that the plaintiff had recovered were excessive.2 6 7 In a third case, Pitney disposed of all of the substantive
issues in a manner favorable to the worker, but reversed a jury
verdict in his favor because some local practice rules in the jurisdiction where the case arose had not been followed.268 Similarly,
in litigation arising under the common law of torts 269 and the
Safety Appliance Act,2 7 0 he ruled for railroad employees injured
on the job.
It was in cases involving workers' compensation statutes,
however, that Pitney aligned himself most dramatically with Progressivism. At the time of his appointment to the Supreme
Court, states had begun to enact laws that made employers liable
without fault for injuries that their workers suffered on the job;
usually these statutes also limited the amount that the victim
could recover. 27 1 New Jersey was a part of this national trend. In
1911, Woodrow Wilson secured enactment of a workers' compensation statute for the state.2 7 2 By then, it had become apparId. § 1, 35 Stat. at 65 (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982)).
Id. § 3, 35 Stat. at 66 (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1982)).
Id. § 4, 35 Stat. at 66 (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 54 (1982)).
See, e.g., Philadelphia, B. & W.R.R. v. Smith, 250 U.S. 101 (1919); Southern
Ry. v. Puckett, 244 U.S. 571 (1917); Erie R.R. v. Welsh, 242 U.S. 303 (1916); Spokane & I.E.R.R. v. Campbell, 241 U.S. 497 (1916); San Antonio & A.P. Ry. v. Wagner, 241 U.S. 476 (1916); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Bower, 241 U.S. 470 (1916);
Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Proffitt, 241 U.S. 462 (1916); Great Northern Ry. v. Knapp,
240 U.S. 464 (1916); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Horton, 239 U.S. 595 (1916);
Kanahwha & Mich. Ry. v. Kerse, 239 U.S. 576 (1916); North Carolina R.R. v.
Zachary, 232 U.S. 248 (1914); Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. Wulf, 226 U.S. 570
(1913).
267 See Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Gainey, 241 U.S. 494 (1916); Chespeake & 0. Ry.
v. Kelly, 241 U.S. 485 (1916).
268 See Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. De Atley, 241 U.S. 310 (1916).
269 See Gila Valley, G. & N. Ry. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94 (1914).
270 See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916); Southern Ry. v. Crockett,
234 U.S. 725 (1914).
271 See A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., supra note 158, at 581; Friedman & Ladinsky,
supra note 261, at 69-72.
272 A. LINK, supra note 18, at 263 (footnote omitted). In 1910, an alliance of New
Idea Republicans and Democrats had tried to secure the enactment of legislation
263
264
265
266
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ent that traditional tort litigation served the interests of
employers no better than it served those of employees; even the
National Association of Manufacturers had concluded that compensation systems were inevitable and probably desirable.273
Nevertheless, in the 1911 case of Ives v. South Buffalo Railwa274 the New York Court of Appeals unanimously struck down
the first state law creating one, holding that it violated both the
New York Constitution and the fourteenth amendment. 275 Constitutional law experts, led by Dean Roscoe Pound of Harvard,
denounced the Ives decision in the press,2 7 6 and Theodore
Roosevelt expressed a desire to see every judge who had participated in the case removed from the bench.2 7 7 In a February 1912
speech, Roosevelt, who was then mounting his challenge to Taft,
urged giving the people the right to recall judicial decisions holding statutes unconstitutional.2 7 8

Although denounced by the

American Bar Association, Roosevelt's proposal and his concomitant attack on judicial power in general elicited a surprising
abolishing the fellow-servant doctrine and other antiworker tort defenses, but Old
Guard Republican strength in the senate had forced them to settle for a measure
that only partially fulfilled their objectives. See generally Tynan, Workmen's Compensationfor Injuries, 34 N.J.L.J. 164 (1911) (discussing New Jersey's workmen's compensation statute).
273 See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 261, at 65-69. Although the assumption
of the risk, contributory negligence, and fellow-servant doctrines all favored the
employer, judges had riddled these rules with so many exceptions that often an
injured worker could win despite them. See id. at 65. In addition, they were a
source of labor unrest and thus interfered with management efforts to "rationalize
and bureaucratize" enterprises. Id. Legal fees were a burden on employers as well
as employees because they tended to eat up much of whatever judgments workers
did manage to recover. Id. at 66.
In 1910, President Taft, set up a commission "to investigate employers' liability and workmen's compensation." A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., supra note 158, at
210. Although headed by conservative Republican Senator George Sutherland of
Utah, it submitted a report in 1912 recommending that the FELA be replaced with
a compulsory workmen's compensation statute. Id. Ironically, organized labor opposed workers' compensation legislation. J. WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN
THE LIBERAL STATE: 1900-1918, at 43 (1968). This was mainly because of the limitations on recovery that such laws usually contained. See id. Union leaders tended
to see legislative abolition of the tort defenses traditionally relied upon by employers as a preferable alternative. See id.
274 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
275 See id. at 317, 94 N.E. at 448.
276 Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 261, at 68.
277 J. LURIE, supra note 256, at 71; see also Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 261, at
68 n.69 (President Theodore Roosevelt expressed revulsion at notion of employees
bearing financial burdens occasioned by their work-related accidents).
278 Stagner, The Recall of Judicial Decisions and the Due Process Debate, 24 AM. J. OF
LEGAL HIST. 257, 257-58 (1980).
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amount of support, even within the legal community. 27 9

If the judiciary were to avoid a successful assault on its authority, it had to adjust constitutional law to accommodate legislation ensuring compensation for the victims of industrial
accidents. Mahlon Pitney did that. In the wake of the Ives decision, New York amended its constitution and then enacted a new
workers' compensation law limited to employees in supposedly
hazardous industries.28 0 In 1916, that statute came before the
Supreme Court in New York Central Railroad v. White. 28 l The employer argued that this law struck "at the fundamentals of constitutional freedom of contract." 282 Speaking for the Court, Pitney
disagreed, holding that it was "a reasonable exercise of the police
power of the State. '2 3 Pitney reasoned that the pecuniary loss
caused by an employee's death or injury had to fall somewhere
and that these damages were, after all, the result of an operation
out of which the employer expected to derive a profit.284 Pitney
concluded that it was not "arbitrary and unreasonable for the
State to impose upon the employer the absolute duty of making a
moderate and definite compensation in money to every disabled
employee. "285
In a companion case, in which the Court upheld an Iowa
statute, Pitney declared "that the employer has no vested right to
have these so-called common-law defenses perpetuated for his
benefit, and that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent a
State from establishing a system of workmen's compensation
without the consent of the employer, incidentally abolishing
[these] defenses. 286 The New Jersey Justice also spoke for the
Court in Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington.2 87 The statute at issue
in that case, unlike the New York law upheld in White, required
employers in hazardous industries to contribute to a state fund
for the compensation of injured workmen, whether or not any
injuries had ever befallen their own employees. 288 Thus, a careful firm had to help pay for the harm caused by its negligent competitors. Nevertheless, stated Pitney, because "accidental
279 See id. at 259-64.
280 See New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 192-97 (1917).
281 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
282 Id. at 206.
283 Id.
284 Id. at 205.
285 Id.

286 Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210, 213 (1917).
287 243 U.S. 219 (1917).
288 Id. at 219-20.
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injuries are inevitable," it could not "be deemed arbitrary or unreasonable for the State, instead of imposing upon the particular
employer entire responsibility for losses occurring in his
own
28 9
plant or work, to impose the burden upon the industry.
Four Justices dissented in Mountain Timber.29 0 This suggests
that the Court had not been nearly as unified in support of the
other two decisions as their reported unanimity indicates. Years
later, Brandeis said of Pitney, "But for [him] we would have had
no workmen's compensation laws." 2 9 ' Originally, the NewJersey
Justice "had been the other way," but "Pitney came around upon
study, ' ' 2 9 2 grasping the economic and sociological arguments for
workers' compensation. He then voted to sustain those laws and
wrote admirable opinions explicating the rationale for doing
SO.

29 3

For the rest of his tenure on the Court, Pitney remained a
champion of workers' compensation. He upheld as consistent
with the fourteenth amendment the extension of New York's
scheme to embrace all employers of four or more workers (even
those in industries that were not hazardous) 29 4 and to provide
payments for disfiguring injuries that did not deprive their victims of income-earning capacity. 2 95 Furthermore, when the
Court held that a New York court's application of New York law
to the case of a stevedore fatally injured while working upon the
navigable waters of New York amounted to an impermissible invasion of the exclusive maritime jurisdiction of the Federaljudici289 Id. at 244.
290 See id. at 246.
291 A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., supra note 158, at 585 (footnote omitted).

Id. (footnote omitted).
See generally Powell, The Workmen's Compensation Cases, 32 POL. ScI. Q. 542, 55369 (1917) (discussing Pitney's workers' compensation decisions). According to
Bickel, "[W]hat Pitney came around to was a narrow and particular ground of decision." A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT,JR., supra note 158, at 585. The Court accepted the
reasonableness of the statute before it, but reserved the right to strike down others
later if it did not like them. Id. Although offensive to proponents of judicial restraint such as Bickel, Pitney's reliance on this approach, rather than on deference
to legislative judgments, serves to demonstrate his commitment to Progressive policies. In an article written shortly after these decisions, Thomas Reed Powell of the
Columbia Law School commended the reasoning of Pitney's opinions precisely because of his acceptance of " 'economic and sociological arguments' " of the type
that the New York Court of Appeals had dismissed in Ives "as not pertinent to the
constitutional issue." Powell, supra, at 560. Powell stated, "Mr. Justice Pitney's
opinion on the constitutionality of workmen's compensation legislation sets an example of judicial reasoning for judges everywhere to emulate." Id. at 569.
294 See Ward & Gow v. Krisky, 259 U.S. 503 (1922).
295 See New York Cent. R.R. v. Bianc, 250 U.S. 596 (1919).
292
293
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ary, Pitney entered a vigorous dissent.2 9 6 Although usually
ruling in favor of the employee, he would go the other way when
this was necessary to protect the integrity of a comprehensive
workers' compensation system. This was also demonstrated in
the case of an injured Texan who sought a higher recovery than
his state's compensation act allowed by bringing a common law
tort action against his employer.2 9 7
On the other hand, Pitney held that if a legislature gave laborers the option of either settling for the amounts authorized by
a compensation statute or bringing tort actions against their employers (whose common law defenses it severely restricted), this
violated neither the equal protection clause nor the due process
clause.2 9 8 The states, he wrote in the Arizona Employers' Liability
Cases,29 9 "are left with a wide range of legislative discretion,
notwithstanding the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment;
and their conclusions respecting the wisdom of their legislative
acts are not reviewable by the courts." 3 0 Novelty was not a constitutional objection.3 ' The statute that the Arizona Legislature
had enacted imposed no new financial burden on hazardous industries; the very nature of these industries made damages from
accidental injuries inevitable. 3 0 2 All this law did was require the
party who organized and took the profits from an enterprise to
treat these damages like other costs of doing business, such as
paying wages.30 3 He could consider them in setting prices and
thus pass through the cost of accidents to the consumer, rather
than leaving injured workers, their dependents, and public welfare agencies to bear the burden. 30 4 Acceptance of such modem
notions about spreading the costs of accidents, so incompatible
with the fundamental assumptions of turn-of-the-century tort
296 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 223 (1917) (Pitney, J.,
dissenting).
297 See Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152 (1919). The employee had argued that the Texas workers' compensation statute violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because it discriminated between
those persons working for employers who had chosen to bring themselves under
the system and those working for employers who had not. See id. at 156.
298 See Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U.S. 400 (1919).
299 250 U.S. 400 (1919).
300 Id. at 419.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 424.
303 Id.
304 See id. at 427.
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law,3 5 apparently did not come easily to Pitney.30 6
That it came at all is indicative of the extent to which one of
the reform movements associated with Progressivism molded his
thinking. Pitney did not always take a Progressive position in labor cases. For example, he voted against both a Federal child
labor statute 0 7 and a state minimum-wage-for-women law. 8
Nevertheless, his positions in cases involving both unions and
unorganized workers reflected the attitudes of Progressive reformers to a surprising extent.
305 See generally G. WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 61-62 (1980) (explaining early
twentieth century views on tort law).
306 Originally, the Arizona Employers' Liability Cases were assigned to Justice
Holmes. See A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., supra note 158, at 586. He wrote an
opinion that took the tack that all risk of damages should be imposed on the employer because he could pass them through to the public. See id. at 587. Holmes's
majority fell apart when the other members of it saw what he had written. See id. at
587-88. At this point, there were four dissenters-including the ChiefJustice, who
had at first been with Holmes. Id. at 586-88. The opinion was also too strong for
some of those who continued to favor upholding the Arizona statute. Id. at 586-87.
One of those was Pitney, to whom the case was reassigned. See id. at 589. Yet, the
opinion that he produced talked about the ability of employers to spread the cost of
accidents and also stressed judicial restraint, the other theme Holmes had planned
to emphasize. See id.
307 See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). See generally S. WOOD,
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA:

CHILD LABOR AND THE LAW

(1968) (discussing child labor reform). On this issue, Pitney was also out of line
with New Jersey, which had passed legislation in 1903 and 1904 forbidding the
employment of children under age 14 in mines, workshops, and factories, and limiting the number of hours per day and per week that youths aged 14 through 16
could be employed in such enterprises. See R. NOBLE, JR., supra note 87, at 122-25.
It strengthened these measures in 1907 and 1910 with laws that limited the hours
of children under age 16 working in mercantile establishments and banned night
work in factories by all persons under age 16. Id.
308 See, e.g., Stettler v. O'Hara, 243 U.S. 629 (1917) (per curiam); see also A.
BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., supra note 158, at 593-603 (discussing Stettler). Immediately after Stettler was argued, Pitney voted with a five-member majority that favored
holding the Oregon minimum-wage-for-women statute unconstitutional. Id. at
595. The decision had not yet been handed down for some unknown reason when
one member of the majority, Justice Lamar, died. See id. at 598. The case was restored to the docket and reargued, but Lamar's replacement, Louis Brandeis, had
to disqualify himself because he had participated as counsel in the first argument.
Id. at 598-99. No other Justice changed his position, and thus an equally-divided
Court affirmed an Oregon Supreme Court decision upholding the law. See id. at
602.
Although voting twice against a minimum-wage law for women, Pitney was part
of the majority that upheld an Oregon statute setting maximum hours for both men
and women and requiring time-and-one-half pay for overtime work. See Bunting v.
Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917). According to one scholar, the reason why he voted
for this law, but against the one at issue in Stettler, was a strong hostility to wage
setting. See J. SEMONCHE, supra note 175, at 342 n.46.
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4. Antitrust and Economic Regulation
The stands Pitney took in litigation arising under the antitrust laws and various state and Federal regulatory statutes also
mirrored the attitudes of Progressive reformers. The lack of
sympathy for railroads, which was such a notable feature of his
career on the New Jersey bench, persisted after his appointment
to the Supreme Court. In disputes between carriers and shippers, Pitney exhibited a consistent preference for the latter.3 0 9
He rejected railroads' challenges to orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, 31 and was almost equally unreceptive to
their constitutional complaints about the rules and rates imposed
upon them by state regulatory agencies. 1 1 Pitney also continued
for the most part to support the efforts of municipal governments
to regulate the corporations that provided their citizens with utility services.3 1 2
The antimonopoly bias that had animated him during his
days as a New Jersey congressman and judge manifested itself in
cases arising under the Sherman Antitrust Act. "As a rule, he
joined with the majority where it upheld and gave vitality to the
Act, and could be counted among the dissenters where the Court
resorted to 'strained and unusual' interpretations of the facts to
uphold the legality of challenged practices. "313 When a Supreme
Court that was growing noticeably more conservative 3 14 ruled in
1917 that the exclusive leasing agreements that the United Shoe
Machinery Company had used to dominate the entire shoe manufacturing business did not violate the Sherman Act, Pitney joined
J. SEMONCHE, supra note 175, at 279; see, e.g., Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,
253 U.S. 117 (1920); Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 249 U.S. 134
(1919); Morrisdale Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 230 U.S. 304, 315 (1913) (Pitney,
J., dissenting); Mitchell Coal & Coke Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 230 U.S. 247, 267
(1913) (Pitney, J., dissenting); Pennsylvania R.R. v. International Coal Mining Co.,
230 U.S. 184, 208 (1913) (Pitney, J., dissenting).
310 See, e.g., O'Keefe v. United States, 240 U.S. 294 (1916); Kansas City S. Ry. v.
United States, 231 U.S. 423 (1913).
311 See, e.g., Darnell v. Edwards, 244 U.S. 564 (1917); Phoenix Ry. v. Geary, 239
U.S. 277 (1915); Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Michigan R.R. Comm'n, 236 U.S. 615
(1915); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Finn, 235 U.S. 601 (1915).
312 See, e.g., Lincoln Gas & Elec. Light Co. v. City of Lincoln, 250 U.S. 256 (1919);
Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 244 U.S. 574 (1917). But see
City of Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U.S. 178 (1918).
313 Levitan, supra note 231, at 761.
314 See A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, JR., supra note 158, at 415; J. SEMONCHE, supra
note 175, at 422-23.
309
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Justices Day3 1 5 and Clarke 31 6 in protesting its decision. When the
Court employed the "rule of reason" to justify rejecting the Government's efforts to dissolve the United States Steel Corporation,
he again stood with these two colleagues in dissent.3 17 Pitney
was, according to one scholar, the Supreme Court's "most consistent supporter of congressional policy as detailed . . . in the
'3 18
antitrust law."
5. Civil Liberties
Although Theodore Roosevelt might not have applauded
them, Pitney's votes in support of governmental efforts to control
monopoly, like his rulings upholding Federal attacks on liquor3 1 9
and prostitution,3 20 were very much in the Progressive tradition. 2 ' So too was Pitney's endorsement of the National Government's attack upon dissent during World War I. For
Progressives, among them President Wilson, American participation in "the war to end all wars" was a great crusade, in which the
Nation fought to eradicate militarism, to protect liberalism, and
to spread democracy.3 2 2 Believing shared convictions were the
cement of society, the Government resorted to publicity and appeals to conscience to unite the Nation behind this greatest of all
reform efforts.3 23 The results were intolerance, vigilantism, and
persecution.1324 Congress passed the repressive Espionage 325 and
Sedition 326 Acts, and despite the apparent inconsistency between
those measures and the first amendment, the Supreme Court affirmed their constitutionality and regularly sustained convictions
obtained under them.3 27 Even the great Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., before penning the first of his famous "clear and
315 See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32, 75 (1918) (Day, J.,
dissenting).

316 See id. at 75 (Clarke, J., dissenting).
317 United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 466 (1920) (Day, J.,

dissenting).
318 J. SEMONCHE, supra note 175, at 423.

319 See, e.g., Exparte Webb, 225 U.S. 663 (1912).
320 See, e.g., Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272 (1912).
321 On Progressive attitudes concerning the control of liquor and prostitution,
see A. LINK & R. MCCORMICK, supra note 6, at 69, 79, 102-03.
322 See D. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN SOCIETY
51 (1980).
323 See id. at 74-75.
324 See id. at 75-88.
325 Ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1917).
326 Ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (1918).
327 See generally Levitan, supra note 231, at 763-67 (discussing Supreme Court's
treatment of cases under Espionage and Sedition Acts).
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present danger" dissents, handed down three decisions in this
vein.*328
Pitney was in good Progressive company when, in Pierce v.
United States,3 29 he upheld the convictions of four Socialists under
section 3 of the Espionage Act3 3 0 based primarily on their distribution of a pamphlet called The Price We Pay. 33 1 This leaflet char-

acterized the war as fought for the benefit of capitalists like J.P.
Morgan, wailed about recruiting officers hauling young men away
to awful deaths, predicted a rise in food prices, and accused the
Attorney General of being so busy jailing those who failed to
stand for the playing of "The Star-Spangled Banner" that he had
no time for prosecuting speculators.3 3

2

"Common knowledge,"

Pitney believed, "would have sufficed to show at least that the
statements as to the causes that led to the entry of the United
States into the war against Germany were grossly false; and such
common knowledge went to prove also that [the] defendants
knew they were untrue. ' 3 3
In his opinion, a jury might have
found that The Price We Pay could tend to cause insubordination
334
in the armed forces and to obstruct recruiting.
Brandeis, on the other hand, considered it inconceivable
that the lurid exaggerations with which this pamphlet was filled
could induce any serviceman of normal intelligence to risk the
328 See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
329 252 U.S. 239 (1920).
330 Section 3 provided:
Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall willfully make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or
to promote the success of its enemies and whoever, when the United
States is at war, shall willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination,
disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of
the United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment
service of the United States, to the injury of the service or of the United
States, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both.
Espionage Act, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (1917).
331 Pierce, 252 U.S. at 253.
332 See id. at 245-47.
333 Id. at 251. Brandeis attributed Pitney's certitude that he knew the real causes
of World War I to his Presbyterianism. Conversations between L.D.B. and F.F., in
Brandeis Papers, supra note 252, folder 14, manuscript box 114. Brandeis stated,
"Pitney... personally is very kindly, though in many ways naive and wholly without
knowledge but still can't shake his Presbyterianism or doesn't realize he is in its
girip." Id.
334

Pierce, 252 U.S. at 249.
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severe penalties prescribed for refusal of duty. 35 In dissent, he
pointed out the harm that could be done to the democratic political process if arguments were treated as criminal incitements
merely because they seemed unfair, mistaken, unsound, or intemperate "to those exercising judiciary power.

'3 3 6

His was a

message lost on Pitney, who joined the majority that upheld numerous other convictions under the Espionage and Sedition Acts
and related state statutes. 37
In voting to jail opponents of the war, Pitney reflected the
temper of his times. His greatest weakness was an inability to
question the accepted wisdom of his own day. Thus, he affirmed
a district court decision that had denied a writ of habeas corpus
to Leo Frank, who was convicted of murder in an Atlanta trial so
dominated by a mob that the defendant had to be absent from
the courtroom when the jury returned its verdict. 3 38 Because

Frank had failed to raise the matter of his exclusion from the
courtroom promptly and because the Georgia courts had considered and had rejected his contention that the jury had been influenced by the threatening atmosphere that surrounded the trial,
Pitney ruled that the defendant had not been denied his fourteenth amendment right to due process of law.339
Such exaggerated deference to state authority and such callous insistence that violations of fundamental rights by state institutions lay beyond Federal control were not peculiar to Pitney.
They remained typical of the Court as a whole until well into the
1920's.34° Furthermore, in refusing to impose national concep-

tions of due process on Georgia, Pitney was taking a position
consistent with the one he adopted in other cases far less controversial than Leo Frank's. 4 ' Still, Holmes could see what Pitney
could not: "Whatever disagreement there may be as to the scope
335 Id. at 272 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
336

Id. at 273 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

337 See Israel, supra note 4, at 2008.
338

See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915). See generally L.

LEO FRANK CASE (1968).
339 Frank v. Mangum,

DINNERSTEIN, THE

237 U.S. 309, 338-40 (1915). Brandeis remarked, "Pitney
had a great sense of justice affected by Presbyterianism but no imagination
whatever." Conversations between L.D.B. and F.F., in Brandeis Papers, supra note
252, folder 14, manuscript box 114.
340 See P. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES: 1918-1969, at 82-83
(1972).
341 See, e.g., Collins v.Johnston, 237 U.S. 502 (1915); Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229
U.S. 586 (1913); Ensign v. Pennsylvania, 227 U.S. 592 (1913); cf. Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530 (1922) (applying Federal due process principles to a
state law).
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of the phrase 'due process of law,' there can be no doubt that it
embraces the fundamental conception of a fair trial. ... Mob law
[cannot be] due process. 3 4 2 Within less than a decade, the
Court would inform the states, through a Holmes opinion, that
the fourteenth amendment limited their discretion at least that
much.3 4 3
C. Resignation and Death
By the time it did this, Mahlon Pitney was no longer on the
Bench. TheJustice who reflected so well the attitudes of the Progressive era departed from the Supreme Court soon after Progressivism came to an end in the sour aftermath of World War
I." 4 In early 1922, while attending a rededication of the Philadelphia room where the Court had held its first session, Pitney
suffered what doctors diagnosed as "a blood clot on the
34 6
brain. 34 5 Chief Justice Taft urged him to take some time off,
and he did.3 4 7 Upon his return to Washington, Pitney still could
not resume a full workload. Taft regarded him as a "weak" member of the Court, and after his "breakdown," he assigned him no
further cases.3 4 8 Pitney wrote only three more opinions before
the end of the Term.3 4 9
Then, in August 1922, he suffered a massive stroke? 5
Pitney now recognized that he would have to leave the Court.3 5 '
Unfortunately, if he did so, he would not be eligible for a pension; he had completed the required ten years of service, but was
still six years short of the mandatory seventy years of age.35 2
Congress enacted special legislation enabling Pitney to retire,3 5 3
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 347 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
See generally B. NOGGLE, INTO THE TWENTIES (1974).
A. Breed, supra note 41, at 164. Breed actually says Pitney suffered this illness
in early 1921, but this appears to be a typographical error. See Israel, supra note 4,
at 2009.
346 See Letter from Chief Justice Taft to Justice Pitney (Jan. 20, 1922), in Pitney
Papers, supra note 38.
347 Letter from Pitney to ChiefJustice Taft (Jan. 21, 1922), in Pitney Papers, supra
note 38.
348 A. MASON, supra note 178, at 213.
349 A. Breed, supra note 41, at 164.
350 Id. at 165.
351 Id. According to certificates submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee
from four physicians, by November, Pitney was also suffering from hardening of the
arteries and Bright's disease. S. 4025, 67th Cong., 3d Sess., 63 CONG. REC. 272
(1922).
352 See A. Breed, supra note 41, at 165-66.
353 Id. at 166.
342
343
344
345
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however, and he did so on December 31, 1922. 354 A little less
than two years later, on December 9, 1924, New Jersey's third
35 5
Supreme Court Justice died at his house in Washington.
Then, for the last time, he came home to Morristown.356
III. CONCLUSION

Neither contemporaries nor historians have ranked Pitney
with the greats of the Supreme Court. Even among the four New
Jersey Justices, he tends to be the forgotten figure. Nonetheless,
Pitney deserves more credit than he has received. At the time he
sat, a previously rural and agrarian America was struggling, often
without really knowing quite how to go about it, to adjust to life
as an urban and industrial society. That, at bottom, was what
Progressivism was all about.3

57

The Country needed judges who

would support, rather than use their judicial power to thwart, the
sometimes unwise but mostly necessary initiatives of a great reform movement. The Nation found one in Mahlon Pitney. Of all
the Justices who sat on the Supreme Court during his tenure,
"Pitney was the most consistent supporter of national reform legislation. ' ' 358
His opinions are as murky as one critic has
charged,359 but he was not the reactionary some have made him

out to be. 3 60 Thrust onto the national scene by New Jersey Progressivism, and a mirror of its values and biases, Justice Pitney
was a contributor to whatever success the Progressive movement
achieved, both in his native state and in the Nation as a whole.
354 Id. at 165.
355 Id. at 167.
356 See id.
357 See generally S. HAYS, THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM:

358 J.SEMONCHE, supra note 175, at 308 n.7.

1885-1914 (1957).

359 See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 160, at 179.
360 See id. at 163-64; cf. Israel, supra note 4, at 2001 (Pitney adequately fulfilled the
role of a Supreme Court Justice).

